This report is a result of an investigation conducted and concluded at an onsite election monitoring centre during the week commencing the 12th of May.

Disclaimer: This report is the result of an investigation conducted and concluded at an onsite election monitoring centre during the week beginning May 12. Its publication date reflects the independent editorial judgment of Alliance4Europe.

Introduction

Lega Artis is a Polish website which was initially launched in 2018 as a legal advisory blog. Since then, it has developed into a pro-Russian information laundering outlet, translating and reposting content from EU-sanctioned state-affiliated Russian media. Even though Lega Artis has been flagged by researchers and journalists, the platform continues to expand its reach on social media. This report uses the case of Lega Artis as an example of how such information threat actors function in Poland.

Under the current EU sanctions regime against Russian and Belarusian state actors, it is illegal to aid such outlets in sharing their content. Hence, social media platforms have a legal duty to remove such content under the Digital Services Act (DSA).

In spite of this legal reality, entities such as Lega Artis continue to spread illegal content in the EU information space using a range of deceptive tactics, techniques and procedures, granting their content an inauthentic sense of legitimacy.

This report is a case study of Lega Artis’s rise to prominence, detailing their following, reach and ability to launder large volumes of Kremlin propaganda into the EU information-sphere, also likely by leveraging automation and AI tools to produce content at an implausible speed and scale to flood the zone with disinformation.