Assessment of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in the 2025 Czech Parliamentary Election

Executive Summary

This report provides a critical assessment of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) during the 2025 Czech parliamentary election period. It examines the methods employed, key perpetrators, evolving tactics, and the efficacy of defensive responses.

The 2025 Czech parliamentary elections took place within an increasingly contested information environment, but the electoral process and Czech society showed strong democratic resilience.

Despite the persistent presence of Russian-linked disinformation channels and attempts to sow doubt about the integrity of the vote, no evidence was found of any coordinated, large-scale foreign interference operations capable of influencing the election. Monitoring conducted by FDEI partners, Czech researchers, and national institutions confirmed that malign actors focused predominantly on long-term efforts to erode public trust – particularly through narratives predicting electoral fraud or manipulation – rather than direct disruption of the voting process. These attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, as both state institutions and the public responded with calm, rational, and transparent engagement.

The elections were found legitimate, orderly, and technically resilient, despite experiencing several minor, isolated incidents. The temporary malfunction of the eDoklady digital identification system caused confusion but did not compromise voter eligibility or security, and the Ministry of the Interior demonstrated effective communication in clarifying the cause. The Czech Police reported no systemic security incidents, and several minor organisational issues were quickly resolved at the local level. Extensive live media coverage and real-time reporting contributed to transparency and helped maintain public confidence throughout the two-day vote.

At the same time, several developments highlighted ongoing vulnerabilities in the Czech information space. Russian state linked actors remain the primary external threat, leveraging a resilient network of proxy websites, rebranded media assets, and cross-platform amplification systems to disseminate strategically aligned narratives. Outlets such as neČT24, the Pravda network, and NewsFront SK used large-scale content laundering to shape discourse, while coordinated TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram clusters helped foreign-origin narratives resonate in public debates. These operations pursued the long-term objectives of undermining institutional trust, weakening Czech support for Ukraine and EU/NATO alignment, and amplifying polarisation around migration, defence spending, and cost-of-living pressures.