Introduction
This briefing was produced through the Counter Disinformation Network reviewing findings around the recent Romanian elections. This overview of findings by analysts in the democracy-defending community points towards the need for more research on what took place. We present anecdotal evidence illustrating a concerning phenomenon. Coordination by Telegram networks around algorithmic amplification of content may include further manipulative techniques that may need to be uncovered along with what actors these networks may be linked to. Furthermore, the potential use of “fan” accounts to circumvent TikTok’s policy on political campaigns might warrant further investigations in future elections.
Background
The first round of the Romanian presidential elections held on the 24th of November had unexpected results: Calin Georgescu, an independent candidate won with 22,94% of the votes. Georgescu will now be running against liberal reformist Elena Lasconi, candidate of the centre-right party USR (Save Romania Union) party.
The second round of the Romanian elections is coming up on December 8th.
The win of the independent candidate Georgescu was completely unexpected, so much so that in the most accredited polls he wasn’t even in the top 5 (1) mainly because his presence was active only on social media, with very few in-person activities like rallies or ad campaigns.
Who is Calin Georgescu?
Calin Georgescu is an agronomist university professor with a PhD in soil science, he served at the UN and European level as a Senior Rapporteur at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Executive Director of the United Nations Global Sustainable Index Institute in Geneva/Vaduz, President of the European Research Centre for the Club of Rome and also held many positions inside the Romanian government. He was part of the far-right party AUR until he left the party in 2022 after infighting that saw his colleagues accuse him of being pro-Russian and critical of NATO. He also sparked a lot of controversies by, among other things, describing members of the fascist governments between the 1930s and 1940s as national heroes. He described Putin as “a man who loves his country” and argued EU and NATO membership do not align with Romania’s interests (2).
Coordinated Content Amplification
Georgescu’s success is attributed to his social media presence and campaign, most notably on TikTok. His followers and views grew exponentially in the last two months, surpassing the yearly growth of the other candidates’ accounts Georgescu’s TikTok account gained 98 million views between September and November 18th. A week later, his account experienced additional growth of 52 million views (3). The Civil society organisation Expert Forum attributes this growth to coordinated inauthentic amplification (4).
Expert Forum has written an extensive report about the issue (5). In their report, we can see how the support and awareness of the candidate were achieved by bypassing TikTok’s rules regarding political campaigns.
A group of influencers on TikTok indirectly promoted Georgescu without naming him, using the hashtag #echilibrușiverticalitate (#equilibriumandverticality) and reading a copy-pasted script of a message of neutrality in regard to the war in Ukraine, the major point of Georgescu’s campaign.
The hashtag promotes Georgescu’s talking points, promoting a neutral Romania (equilibrium) and economic independence (verticality).
Democracy Reporting International also pointed out how accounts posing as “fans” of Georgescu, using his campaign material and images are posting content promoting him (6), potentially circumventing TikTok’s policy on political parties’ campaigning on their platform (7)
After the election results were announced, many in Romania started to wonder for the first time who exactly Georgescu was. Despite his resume, he had never really featured in the nation’s public discourse.
Before his win, he was hardly ever mentioned outside of the social media sphere. After his victory, screenshots started appearing on Reddit of a Telegram group called “Propagatorcg” which gave clues as to how this social media success had been obtained (8).
After seeing the Reddit post, we investigated the Telegram group and verified and documented the activities of the channel.
The screenshots below show how the Propagatorcg Telegram group’s administrators advised on how to manipulate the algorithm and create as much engagement as possible without being flagged as bots. Most noticeable were the admins’ instructions to save videos and tweak them by adding music or changing the length and then re-uploading them. Another noteworthy example includes posts advising users on how to post comments without appearing to be robots. The page also posted copy-pastable messages and clear instructions on how to post the messages without being flagged as bots:
Image 1: In the last message of this screenshot we can see a description of the group: “Greetings friends, I come with some information about propagator, propagator is a folder on the internet where we keep video clips of the gentleman Calin Georgescu. All of the clips saved on propagator must be edited and then posted, if you just copy-paste them, those from META, TikTok etc… won’t see them”
Image 2: In the first message it says “In case you leave a comment under a post, remember to make it as original and diverse as you can! This way people will understand that we are here only to support Romanian people, we are not ROBOTS, as others say when they try to dirty our image”
Image 3: An example of copy-pasted comments ready to be spammed and then in the last message they write: “You can use those in the TikTok comments, change them every five comments, don’t comment too fast and don’t go up too fast between posts”.
The following screenshots show how instructions were given to download videos and re-upload them tweaked in order to create engagement:
Image 4: The first message shows instructions on how to post videos on TikTok saying: “Before you post a video on TikTok, you have on the top right side a sign with a yellow circle around it. In that section, you can reduce the length of the video (change it as much as you wish). Up, on top of the image, you have the section “Add Sound” in red. There you can add a soundtrack, BE CAREFUL to be LOWER, than the original sound”
According to an initial investigation conducted by G4media.ro, this is not the only Telegram group but seems to be a branch of a larger network that is very well coordinated and that entices its users to post as much as possible by even creating some form of competition for the best user of the month. The prize is only recognition and maybe a possibility to be noticed by Gregorescu himself (9). More research is required to verify and further flesh out these findings.
According to Cristian Andrei, a political consultant based in Bucharest, interviewed by Associated Press on the matter: “Georgescu lacks an agenda, and has a vague and populist manifesto with positions that are “beyond the normal discourse.” His stances include supporting Romanian farmers, reducing dependency on imports, and ramping up energy and food production” (10).
This kind of result is unprecedented for Romania, which never before had an independent candidate who managed to receive such a large vote share and proceed to the second ballot, all without the support of a party or even the need to personally attend rallies or campaigns. This is significant particularly because it may be a harbinger of the use of the same approaches in other elections.
Key DISARM Techniques
The DISARM Red Framework gives us a common taxonomy to describe the manipulative behaviours employed to manipulate an information environment. In this short report, we will use it to describe, based on the evidence we have, what likely techniques were used to increase the reach of Georgescu.
Objectives
T0136.006: Cultivate Support for Ally
The influence operation covered in this report aimed to cultivate support for Georgescu.
Platforms used
The influence operation used the video platform TikTok to post and amplify the operation’s content.
T0151.007: Chat Broadcast Group
Telegram broadcasting groups were used as a command and control infrastructure, providing instructions on how to manipulate TikTok’s algorithm.
Manipulative behaviours used
T0121: Manipulate Platform Algorithm
Based on our findings and the report of Expert Forum, there were coordinated attempts to promote Georgescu by manipulating TikTok’s algorithm.
T0049: Flood Information Space
The attempts to manipulate TikTok’s algorithm were done in a coordinated manner flooding TikTok with content promoting Georgescu.
T0129.001: Conceal Network Identity
The coordination of the accounts flooding TikTok was not transparent about the coordinated nature of the campaign.
T0120.002: Use Contests and Prizes
According to G4media.ro, some of the Telegram Groups were making competitions out of the coordinated amplification.
Influencers might potentially also have been used to promote narratives aligning with the interests of Georgescu.
Conclusions
In conclusion, social media manipulation has contributed to the success of Calin Georgescu’s campaign. Over just a few months, his presence has grown much faster than that of his competition, and this report offers insight into how this objective has been achieved.
Signs of coordinated inauthentic behaviour require more rigorous investigation, especially in relation to elections. TikTok should be held to investigate whether coordinated inauthentic behaviour was employed to amplify the campaign and publicly report the results. Independent researchers should have better access to TikTok’s data, allowing them to independently investigate the use of coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
Considering Democracy Reporting International’s previous reports on the use of “fan” accounts on TikTok during the European Parliament and French snap elections (11), this is a technique we should monitor in future elections.
We will also be investigating if Telegram will be used to coordinate similar algorithmic manipulation in future elections.
Want to know more? Members of the CDN have been investigating Romania. Feel free to reach out and we can connect you with experts working on the elections.
Further reading from our partner organisations
DRI: Manufactured Support: How Inauthentic Activity on TikTok Bolstered the Far-Right in Romania
ApTI, Expert Forum, ActiveWatch: TikTok – a catalyst for extremist views and breaching electoral legislation in Romania. Do we have a democratic process with DSA?
Editor: Saman Nazari.