
EU Unrest Report

How France's October 2026 protests were manipulated, then retold abroad

Alliance4Europe · 21 October 2026 · Data window 11–18 October 2026

HEADLINE

The 17 October protests were French in origin and in grievance. However, we found evidence that foreign actors worked actively to amplify and inflame public anger and polarization. Abroad, these protests became a different story. Russia's Pravda network published 1,018 articles across 28 sites in nine languages, and anglophone far-right influencers and US conservative media told foreign audiences that migrants were to blame, days before the riots began.

Executive summary.

The October 2026 protests were born in France, and their causes lie in France. We found no evidence that a foreign actor was behind the origin of these protests. We did find, however, that foreign actors worked actively to amplify and inflame public anger, both before and after the protests, and to applaud violence, with the further aim of polarising the debate and dividing French society.

Inside France, foreign actors worked to fan the flames. Abroad, Russian state outlets, anglophone far-right influencers and US media reframed the unrest around migration and presented it as spreading across Europe.

Alliance4Europe's study covers 547,471 posts published on X, Telegram, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook and news sites, in nine languages, as well as 12,839 comments posted under the most-viewed videos. We traced the Russian operations back to 1 September 2026, mapped the accounts running them and reconstructed their infrastructure: twenty-three of the network's redirect sites share a single IP address.

In the six weeks before 17 October, a bot network that we attribute with high confidence to Russia's Doppelganger operation posted 639 coordinated messages in French, German, English and Polish, seen roughly 7.4 million times. It seized on real grievances and turned them, dishonestly, against Ukraine: "Every euro for Kyiv is a euro stolen from our common prosperity" (translated from French). It invoked the memory of the 2018 "yellow vest" protests against fuel price rises and the carbon tax, mainly targeted centrist, democratic-left, pro-European and pro-Ukraine politicians, and praised both certain measures proposed by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and an unnamed "patriot" candidate. The operation is pragmatic and opportunistic: it backs no particular party, but pursues an objective that serves Vladimir Putin's regime, namely that France stop supporting Ukraine.

Once the riots broke out, their story was picked up and distorted abroad. Roughly one post in thirty-three in French directly blamed migrants or Islam; in English, nearly one in five. The unfounded claims that immigrants had set fire to Limoges town hall circulated 3.6 times more in English than in French, and appeared in our data about six hours earlier in English. The Russian Pravda network published 1,018 articles across twenty-eight sites in nine languages, copying content from one site to the next within minutes. This content targets machines as much as human readers. A chatbot has already cited the network's French site while repeating Kremlin falsehoods,¹ and ten AI tools previously tested repeated the network's claims in a third of cases.² Researchers argue the network is also designed to reach the data used to train AI models, a tactic they call "LLM grooming".³

This is not only about France, nor even about Europe. In Canada, Russian operations and pro-Trump voices amplified the same separatist cause.⁴ Pages based outside Europe sell "decline" narratives to European audiences to generate clicks.^{5,6}

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Key findings.

Each finding ends with linked tags. [Data] marks what we measured; [Analysis] marks our assessment of it. Click a tag to jump to the evidence.

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- 01 Domestic origin.** The mobilisation map (17octobregiletjaune.net) and its 25,900-member Telegram channel were set up on 14–15 September, are fronted by French collectives (the operator is not identified) and were built from French open data. We found no foreign fingerprint in hosting, DNS or tracking. [\[Data: section 9\]](#) [\[Data: how the map was built\]](#)
-
- 02 A migration story exported abroad.** 3.0% of French-language posts blame migrants or Islam, against 18.7% of English and 12.6% of Polish posts. Comment sections show the same gap: 0.3–0.7% of French comments against 2.6–4.3% of English ones. [\[Data: Figure 3\]](#) [\[Data: Figure 15\]](#)
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- 03 Limoges was blamed on immigrants in English first.** Claims that immigrants or Muslims set the town hall fire appeared 3.6 times more in English than in French, and first appeared in our data in English, about six hours before French. No evidence supports them. [\[Data: Limoges language table\]](#)
-
- 04 Russian amplification at industrial pace.** The Pravda network published 1,018 on-topic articles across 28 sites in nine languages, 78% after the riots, copying 272 items across two to five of its sites, 90% of them within five minutes. This fits an aim of seeding search and AI models rather than reaching local readers. NewsGuard has already found an AI chatbot citing Pravda's France site when repeating Kremlin falsehoods.¹ [\[Data: Figure 8\]](#) [\[Data: Pravda gallery\]](#) [\[Analysis: how we identify Pravda sites\]](#)
-
- 05 Russia worked French anger for six weeks before the protests.** From 2 September to 14 October, Russia's Doppelganger bot network posted 639 messages in 22 synchronised waves in French, German, English and Polish, with about 7.4 million views. It turned real grievances against Ukraine aid ("Chaque euro pour Kiev est un euro volé"), recalled the 2018 Gilets jaunes fuel revolt, and attacked centrist and pro-Ukraine figures while promoting Mélenchon and an unnamed "patriote". Its last detected wave came three days before 17 October. Alethea independently identified the same operation's 7–9 October wave targeting France's 2027 race.⁷ [\[Data: Figure 9\]](#) [\[Analysis: Doppelganger section\]](#)
-
- 06 The "who is behind it" frame came from US television.** Fox News's "EXPOSES who is behind France student protests" (1.45 million views, 12 October) predates the "organised communist network" claim on X and Telegram. Riot footage then fed membership, course and donation funnels on PragerU, Fox, GB News and others. [\[Data: section 13\]](#) [\[Analysis: section 15\]](#)
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07 Iran is the most focused state voice. Iran's French-language Press TV and IRNA gave 34–37% of all their output to the unrest, more than any Russian outlet. [\[Data: section 11\]](#) [\[Data: Figure 14\]](#)

08 Coordination is Russian and targeted, not a mass operation. The clearest coordination is Russian: the Doppelgänger waves on X and Telegram relays (a Pravda Poland mirror, Russian-language feeder families). The large X amplification clusters and the comment sections look organic.

[\[Analysis: CIB review\]](#)

[\[Analysis: PHIA scale\]](#)

09 AI is now the target, the tool and the referee. Russia's Pravda network writes for machines. Republishing the same story across 28 sites creates the appearance of corroboration that AI search rewards, and the EU's diplomatic service already suspects the network of "LLM grooming". An AI-assisted content farm drew 244,000 views with a single Limoges video. And when audiences wanted answers, they asked a chatbot: 90 posts in our sample tagged X's Grok to rule on the riots.

[\[Analysis: section 18\]](#)

[\[Data: section 13\]](#)

Context.


A month of high school blockades and cost of living anger in France converged on Saturday 17 October with unions and students, partially joined by Gilets jaunes groups. Between 550,000 (official estimate) and 800,000 (organisers' estimate) marched; the evening brought looting, attacks on town halls and prefectures, with more than 2,000 arrests. The same day, cost-of-living and housing protests ran in Italy, Portugal and Belgium, and housing protests continued in Spain after the death of an evicted 87-year-old, María del Carmen ("Maricarmen") Abascal. Donald Trump, JD Vance and Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar framed the unrest as a migration crisis on 18 October.

We collected 547,471 posts across news, X, Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit, Bluesky and forums in nine languages, analysed the 246,355 relevant posts from 11–18 October, extracted everything 387 key players and threat actors posted, and read 12,839 comments under the most-watched TikTok and YouTube videos.

Breakdown.


01 Volume and timing

FIGURE 1

Figure 1. Posts per day by source, 11–18 October (Meltwater sources; Exorde and Telegram are samples). Data: [Data appendix, table 1](#)

Volume tripled on the day of action and kept rising on 18 October as the riot imagery spread abroad. The narrative mix shifted with it: economic grievance lost ground while civil-war and heritage frames rose.

FIGURE 2



Day in October · bars on a shared 0–18% scale

Figure 2. Share of each day's relevant posts by narrative. Data: [Data appendix, table 2](#)

02 Narratives

NARRATIVES BY VOLUME



Posts tagged with each narrative, 11–18 October. Data: table below.

Narrative	Posts (8 days)	Where it concentrates (language share; platform lift)
Economic grievance (fuel, housing, schools)	30,684	Portuguese 31%, Spanish 30%, Italian 14%; facebook 2.5x, reddit 1.8x
Migration / Islam blame	19,344	English 19%, Polish 13%, German 8%; reddit 3.6x, facebook 1.6x
Civil war / collapse	12,293	German 14%, Polish 14%, English 9%; facebook 2.5x, youtube 1.6x
Police violence	9,476	Russian 7%, French 6%, English 3%; facebook 2.4x, telegram 1.8x
Ukraine war link	8,052	Russian 22%, Italian 6%, Polish 6%; telegram 4.3x, reddit 4.3x
Far-left blame	8,355	French 5%, English 4%, Dutch 3%; facebook 2.7x, x 1.3x
Heritage destroyed (Limoges)	5,255	German 6%, Russian 4%, English 3%; telegram 2.9x, facebook 2.9x
Revolution / insurrection	4,135	Russian 3%, English 3%, French 2%; reddit 6.7x, facebook 2.2x

FIGURE 3





Figure 3. Share of posts using the migration / Islam frame, by language. Data: [Data appendix, table 3](#)

Known high-profile accounts post under 2% of any narrative's volume. They set the frame; the volume comes from the networks that repeat it.



EVIDENCE

JD Vance on X, 18 October: the migration frame from the US Vice-President. [Open original](#)

Claims we are tracking

Claim	Assessment	Posts	Languages (posts)	First seen (UTC)
Greta Thunberg at the student protests	Event reporting (context)	3,666	en:2379, fr:759, it:140, de:98, es:71	2026-10-11 00:04
Greta Thunberg "supporting Islamic riots"	Misleading framing	1,333	en:1244, fr:39, de:19, it:11, pt:7	2026-10-11 07:00
Immigrants / Muslims set the Limoges fire	Unsubstantiated	406	en:240, de:42, fr:39, ru:38, es:20	2026-10-17 14:30
"Louis XVI" chant against Macron	Real chant; needs context	184	fr:126, en:52, ru:3, pt:2	2026-10-12 13:30
"Muslims cheer" as the bell tower falls	Unsubstantiated	12	en:12	2026-10-17 19:23
Trump: "Islam wanting to take over" France (13 Oct)	Unverified attribution	7	en:7	2026-10-12 15:13
"30,000 looters in Marseille"	Verify official figure	3	en:2, fr:1	2026-10-18 14:04
Protesters burned "National Guard barracks"	Likely false	1	en:1	2026-10-17 23:33



EVIDENCE

An X account recasts a Gen-Z protest slogan ("Bismillah") as Greta Thunberg chanting a "jihadist phrase". [Open original](#)

03 Geography: Limoges and the flashpoints

FIGURE 4





Figure 4. Posts about the main flashpoints from home-language and foreign-language accounts. Data: [Data appendix, table 4](#)

We mapped every place with 15 or more posts. Limoges drew 6,793 posts, 68% of them not in French. Smaller towns tell the domestic story: police-violence footage dominates Saint-Étienne, Lens and Metz; school blockades dominate Saint-Denis, Bron and Créteil. Brussels and Tirana were used by foreign accounts as proof of contagion.

FIGURE 5



Share of each language's Limoges posts, %

Figure 5. How posts about the Limoges fire were framed, by language. Data: [Data appendix, table 5](#)

Who blamed immigrants for Limoges, and in which language

Claims that immigrants, Muslims or "diversity" set the town hall fire have no evidence behind them. We traced all 482 posts making the claim (about 420 accounts) out of 7,114 posts that mention Limoges. They appeared far more in English than in French, and in English first.


Language	Claim posts	Share of that language's Limoges posts	Forwarded / copy-paste / original	First seen in our data, 17 Oct (UTC)
English	237	11.1%	90 / 21 / 126	14:30 ("leftist-Islamist" wording from 08:20)
Russian	67	13.2%	19 / 31 / 17	18:25
French	66	3.2%	2 / 3 / 61	20:22
German	50	14.5%	14 / 7 / 29	19:47
Spanish	24	2.3%	5 / 3 / 16	19:54
Italian	8	10.4%	0 / 0 / 8	00:41 (18 Oct)

English carried 3.6 times as many claim posts as French, and the claim made up 11% of English Limoges posts against 3% of French ones.

Half of the English and three-quarters of the Russian spread was forwarded or copy-pasted; French posts were mostly individual comments or relays of JD Vance's "immigration" remark.

Main wordings: "leftist-Islamist aligned rioters" (46 posts), "destroyed by diversity" (26, all English, first on CIG Telegram), "Muslims cheer as bell tower falls" (12).

Account location is filled in for only 22 posts, so language is our territory proxy: the audience was mainly anglophone international, then Russian- and German-speaking. Assessment: it is highly likely the attribution narrative circulated mainly outside France.



EVIDENCE

Disclose.tv on Telegram, 17 October: the Limoges post forwarded by 34 channels. [Open original](#)

04 Russian state-linked amplification

FIGURE 6

■ Before 17 October ■ 17 October onward



Figure 6. Pravda network articles about the unrest, per six hours. Data: [Data appendix, table 6](#)

FIGURE 7





Figure 7. Pravda network articles by site (subdomain of news-pravda.com), top 10. Data: [Data appendix, table 7](#)

FIGURE 8

Figure 8. Pravda network articles by language of the article. Data: [Data appendix, table 8](#)

How we know a site belongs to the Pravda network

Known infrastructure. The network ("Portal Kombat") was first documented by France's VIGINUM in February 2024 and mapped further by DFRLab, CheckFirst and the American Sunlight Project in 2025. Its sites are subdomains of news-pravda.com (for example france.news-pravda.com, albania.news-pravda.com) and older pravda-xx.com domains. We counted only sites on that documented list; we did not add sites by inference.

Shared template. Every site uses the same layout, green "PRAVDA" masthead, menu (Ukraine, Russia, World, Videos) and article format, visible in the gallery below.

No original journalism. Each article is an automated repost of a Telegram, RT, TASS or other source post, with a "Source: Telegram ..." line. The same item appears on several sites within minutes: 272 items ran on two to five sites, 90% of the copies within five minutes of the first (median 1.6 minutes).

Counted by real site. We count each article by the site that published it (28 news-pravda.com sites). Media-monitoring feed labels for these sites are unreliable (one feed labelled for Greece carries france.news-pravda.com), and the separate outlet Pravda.ru is excluded.

What this does not show. A site branded for a country does not mean anyone there reads it. The network's value is in volume: search engines and AI chatbots index it.

AI answers. It already reaches AI answers. In NewsGuard's April 2026 audit, Anthropic's Claude repeated pro-Kremlin false claims 15% of the time and backed them with RT and three Pravda sites, including France.News-Pravda.com.¹ The Global Disinformation Index finds Russian state-linked actors exploiting "data voids" so that models repeat Kremlin narratives in their own voice,⁸ and Bloomberg has reported leaked files describing a Russian plan to influence AI chatbots and search results.⁹ In an earlier NewsGuard test, ten leading AI tools repeated Pravda network falsehoods in a third of cases,² and researchers at the American Sunlight Project argue the network is designed to reach the data collected to train AI models, a tactic they call "LLM grooming".³ Citation in live answers is shown; entry into training data is the researchers' assessment, not yet demonstrated for specific models. The 1,018 articles in this case are that raw material.

Gallery: the same story in nine languages


One article per site, each with France or Limoges in the headline. The Belgian (Dutch), Albanian (English) and Austrian (German) sites carry the same piece, "France, Belgium and now Albania: student protests turned into pogroms", within hours. Each image links to the article.




france.news-pravda.com (FR), 2026-10-11: "La convergence des souffrances" **Open**



francais.news-pravda.com (FR), 2026-10-12: "Deux journées de mobilisation annoncées en France en octobre" **Open**



news-pravda.com (EN), 2026-10-13: "By this hour. A new wave of protests by high school students in France Zelensky confirmed that Kiev had not re" **Open**




usa.news-pravda.com (EN), 2026-10-14: "WOW: Activists set a car on fire near Place Vauban in Paris, France, amid ongoing RIOTS leading to clashes with" **Open**




spanish.news-pravda.com (ES), 2026-10-11: "Los estudiantes en #Bélgica se han unido a una ola de protestas más amplia vinculada a la de la vecina Francia" **Open**




spain.news-pravda.com (ES), 2026-10-17: "Francia arde: noche violenta en medio de las masivas protestas con saqueos y disturbios (VIDEOS)" **Open**




deutsch.news-pravda.com (DE), 2026-10-11: "Nach Frankreich brennt es in Belgien: Krawalle in Brüssel und Lüttich (Quelle)" **Open**




germany.news-pravda.com (DE), 2026-10-11: "Seit Tagen brennt Frankreich!" **Open**




italy.news-pravda.com (IT), 2026-10-17: "- Le proteste di oggi in Francia avrebbero dovuto rappresentare l'apice dei disordini che scuotono il paese d" **Open**




dutch.news-pravda.com (NL), 2026-10-13:
"In Frankrijk zijn ongeveer 200 middelbare scholen gesloten vanwege protesten van leerlingen" [Open](#)



belgium.news-pravda.com (NL), 2026-10-15:
"Frankrijk, België en nu Albanië: studentenprotesten worden pogroms" [Open](#)



hungary.news-pravda.com (HU), 2026-10-18: "A francia hadsereg és rendőrség 24 óra belül helyreállíthatná a rendet, ha Franciaország politikai vezetése e" [Open](#)




poland.news-pravda.com (PL), 2026-10-18:
„Zachodni liberałowie przywieźli do swoich krajów mścicielskich krajów Trzeciego Świata pod pretekstem różnorodności" [Open](#)




portugal.news-pravda.com (PT), 2026-10-13:
"Como as elites Francesas levaram a sociedade a falar sobre a guerra civil" [Open](#)



portuguese.news-pravda.com (PT), 2026-10-13:
"Como as elites Francesas levaram a sociedade a falar sobre a guerra civil" [Open](#)




albania.news-pravda.com (EN), 2026-10-15:
"France, Belgium, and now Albania: student protests turned into pogroms" [Open](#)



austria.news-pravda.com (DE), 2026-10-15:
"Frankreich, Belgien, Österreich und jetzt – Albanien: Studentenproteste sind zu Plünderungen, Randalen und Krawallen eskaliert" [Open](#)



mali.news-pravda.com (FR), 2026-10-14: "Que le chaos règne: les écoliers mettent le feu à la France, Macron et Mélenchon échangent des slogans" [Open](#)



eu.news-pravda.com (EN), 2026-10-12: "School students' protests erupted in Brussels after France" [Open](#)

Laundering. Pravda articles cite 637 Telegram links and 196 links to MAX, the Russian state-backed messenger. Sources include RT, RIA, Izvestia, Rybar's Europe channel, French-language pro-Kremlin channels and the US QAnon hub SGTNewsNetwork (22 links): Russian infrastructure relaying American conspiracy content.

Frames. "Europe is on fire again: who is behind it?"; "Italy erupted after France"; "student protests turned into pogroms"; the Belarusian foreign minister calling the unrest "the cost of supporting military conflicts"; Trump's "close your borders".

Spain, selectively. Of thousands of Spanish posts on Maricarmen, Pravda picked the euthanasia conspiracy and "Sánchez is exploiting her death": A4E's "disinformation disparity" pattern of amplifying the most polarising domestic content.

Rybar network. Rybar's main, Italian, Spanish and English channels published the same riots piece within one minute on 17 October. Colonelcassad (60–80k views a post) cheered rioters ("Free France!").


RT. RT's X account links to the mirror domain rt-english.com; news sites and Telegram link to RT mirrors 279 times.

Telegram relays. Pravda Poland's Telegram channel reposted the Polish channel olej_w_glowie 163 times out of 163, always 16–31 minutes later. Russian finance and "lifestyle" channels run feeder chains (banki_oil → politics_2_0 and novosti_efir; apwagner → swodki).

Doppelganger: six weeks of working French anger

A4E's standing Meltwater trackers for known Russian operations (Doppelganger, Operation Overload, Storm-1516) found a Doppelganger burst on 14 October. We then ran an improved version of the Doppelganger tracker back to 1 September, recovered post text and links from public X embeds, and mapped the network.

FIGURE 9

Figure 9. Doppelganger posts on X in synchronised multi-language waves, per day. Data: [Data appendix, table 9](#)

Scale. From 2 September to 14 October the network posted 639 messages in 22 coordinated waves, with about 7.4 million views: 214 in French, 201 in German, 193 in English and 31 in Polish. Each wave runs German, then French, then English, a minute or two apart. The biggest, on 8 October, put out 97 posts in three minutes.

Bot accounts in batches. The posting accounts were created in tight cohorts: 163 within three days on 12–14 August, 24 on 6–7 September and others on 20 March and 4 October. They use Western female persona names with random handle suffixes, and many earlier ones are already suspended.

Headlines from cloned or fake outlets. Posts link through 51 throwaway or hijacked domains (mostly .ch) to articles; the German ones are branded "DER SPIEGEL". Of the 34 domains that still resolve, 23 sit on a single IP address (95.182.80.252, registered to Cloud Software FZCO), and two more clusters of four share an address each.

The message: your bills are high because of Ukraine and Brussels. Energy and fuel prices, wages, pensions, youth unemployment, hospitals and schools, set against "milliards pour Kiev", Brussels and rearmament, with calls to buy Russian gas again. Headlines include "Deux euros le litre et le souvenir des gilets jaunes : le carburant provoque à nouveau une crise politique" and "Le fantôme de 2018 hante Macron": the fuel-price mood that fed 17 October, primed weeks in advance.

Who it hits and who it helps. In France it attacks Macron and his possible successors (Attal, Philippe) and Raphaël Glucksmann, the most pro-Ukraine candidate. It promotes Mélenchon's wage proposal, "la gauche" and an unnamed "vrai patriote à l'Élysée". Le Pen and the RN barely appear (one mention). In Germany it predicts the collapse of the Merz coalition and says the AfD is "collecting the discontented".

Silent during the protests. The last wave our tracker detected was on 14 October, and we found no posts about the protests themselves on 15–19 October: it shaped the mood beforehand.


Independent corroboration. On 16 October Alethea independently reported a new Doppelganger wave, run by the Social Design Agency and Structura, aimed at the US midterms, Israel's election and France's 2027 presidential race: between 7 and 9 October, more than 50 fake accounts amplified by over 1,000 bots produced an estimated 150,000+ quote-posts on X, linking to cloned Le Parisien and Le Point sites held in reserve for 17

months.⁷ Those are the three largest waves in our data (40, 97 and 50 posts). Alethea also reports that the network's "Invisible Ink" technique evades keyword-based monitoring, which is consistent with none of these posts appearing in our keyword collection.


Precedent. The 2018 echo is not new ground for Moscow: during the 2018–19 *Gilets jaunes* protests, up to 600 accounts affiliated with the Russian government, with RT and Sputnik, heavily promoted the movement, focusing on violent or provocative incidents.¹⁰



Doppelganger burst, 14 Oct 08:17 UTC: "Qui paie ce chaos énergétique ? Nous, les Français !" Account created 7 Sept; unrelated Paris trivia video. [Open](#)



Same burst, 08:18: "Chaque euro pour Kiev est un euro volé à notre prospérité commune." [Open](#)



Same burst, 08:18: "Occupons-nous de nos malades, de nos écoles et de nos routes avant de nourrir l'industrie militaire." [Open](#)



Same burst, German template, 08:18: "Die Ukraine sprengte unsere Pipelines, und Merz liefert weiter Waffen. Das ist staatlicher Terror gegen Deutschland!" [Open](#)

Assessment: coordinated inauthentic behaviour is almost certain; that this is the Doppelganger operation is highly likely (posting pattern, account cohorts, persona naming, redirect domains, cloned outlet branding, messaging). That it was aimed at the French cost-of-living mood ahead of 17 October is likely. There is no evidence that it backed one French party: it is highly likely the aim was to weaken the centre and pro-Ukraine voices and to boost whoever opposes support for Ukraine, on either flank. This matches Russia's pragmatic pattern elsewhere in Europe.

Limits: about two-thirds of posts could no longer be read because accounts were suspended; we counted only waves of eight or more posts, so the totals are a floor. The redirector domains no longer serve pages, so the final article sites could not be checked. A search of Meta's Ad Library found no matching French ads since September; a Page Meta later disabled ("Brian Lockwood") ran ads with the same "euro pour Kiev" wording in June and July 2026, which is worth a separate look.

The French Overload tracker found no Overload activity. It surfaced a six-week-old X account (created 5 September), which posted 303 times on 17–18 October, mostly looting clips relayed from TikTok and tagged to BFMTV, CNEWS and Frontières, one with about a million views. Its timeline reads as a real, very active far-right supporter rather than a bot: domestic amplification, not a Russian operation.

05 Foreign political and influencer amplification

FIGURE 10




Figure 10. First post by each Known Actor using the migration / Islam frame. Data: [Data appendix, table 10](#)

On X the migration frame runs through a small set of hubs: Radio Genoa (reposted by 517 accounts in our sample), Tommy Robinson (299), Visegrad24 (188) and Mario Nawfal (130). Vance and Trump tie France explicitly to the 3 November US midterms; Tusk and Magyar echo the hard-border line.



EVIDENCE

Tommy Robinson on X, 12 October: a Paris market fire becomes "Western Europe is dying". [Open original](#)

The two clusters we reviewed


Our network analysis of X surfaced two large clusters of accounts amplifying the unrest. Large, fast-forming clusters can be a sign of coordinated inauthentic behaviour, so we tested both. Neither proved to be coordinated.

Indian right-wing accounts (526). 98% reposts around a few Indian hubs (vijaygajerao, iyervval), about Indian domestic politics, peaking on 15–17 October before the riots. No synchronised posting; account ages match the baseline. Assessment: CIB unlikely; organic fandom. One account in its orbit posted 22 reposts in about 30 milliseconds: automation likely.

@realMaalouf, Pat Condell and BRICSinfo (2,591 accounts). 87% reposts; a third blame migration or Islam. 344 of 486 "Greta" posts are reposts of one realMaalouf tweet from 14 October. No synchrony beyond our collection windows; normal account ages. Assessment: CIB unlikely. BRICSinfo posts are mirrored by 10 or more Telegram channels within 52 minutes: coordinated cross-posting is a realistic possibility.


06 Channels


FIGURE 11

Figure 11. How much more (or less) often each narrative appears on each platform than on average. Data: [Data appendix, table 11](#)

Platform	Role	What is distinctive
Telegram	Russian framing	Ukraine link 4.3x, foreign-interference claims 3.1x the average
X	Elite and foreign amplification	Migration 1.6x, contagion 2.1x; most rows are reposts
Facebook	Organising and comment fights	Mobilisation calls 3.9x, far-left blame 2.7x
Reddit (English)	Radicalised discussion	Migration 3.6x, revolution 6.7x
YouTube	Video evidence layer	Civil war 1.6x; #franceprotests Shorts
TikTok / Instagram	Youth and grievance	Economic grievance 1.4x; Gen-Z slogans
Bluesky	French left and news	Least divisive (migration 0.2x); biggest #17octobre hub

FIGURE 12

Figure 12. Share of relevant posts by platform. Data: [Data appendix, table 12](#)



EVIDENCE

actu.paris on TikTok (359k views): police stop a march in Paris, a typical police-violence clip. [Open original](#)

07 Spain: Maricarmen and the 29 November election

FIGURE 13




Figure 13. Spanish-language posts per day: Maricarmen against France. Data: [Data appendix, table 13](#)

Maricarmen is the largest single story outside France: about 5,700 posts in eight days.

Election content: 6,188 Spanish-language posts. Vox (169 posts) and Santiago Abascal (69) are the most active accounts; the PP appears in 26% of posts, Vox in 14%, "fondos buitres" (vulture funds) in 10%.

Manipulation hooks: 125 posts claim she was "murdered" or "euthanised"; a fake-letter claim is under review by Maldita; the Madrid regional government linked the Sol housing camp to terrorist groups.

Next dates: the 11 November housing general strike, then the 29 November election.

Did a network drop Maricarmen for France?

We tested this directly. It is highly unlikely that a network switched topics; the shift is highly likely an ordinary news cycle.

The decline started first. Spanish Maricarmen posts fell from 1,751 (11 October) to 825 (13 October), four days before France spiked, and the fall shows in both Exorde and Meltwater.

Total Spanish volume rose. Spanish posting went up on 17–18 October, mostly Spanish news covering France; nothing was "switched off".

Maricarmen accounts moved less than others. Of active accounts that posted on Maricarmen, 39% moved fully to France, against 54% of a baseline of Spanish political accounts. Non-media accounts moved even less (24%). The move was led by media.

No synchronised switch. The 325 accounts that switched did so on the general Spanish France curve; non-media switchers took a median 88 hours between topics and share only small, single-person cross-posting clusters. 296 of the 325 sit outside any amplification community.


08 Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Albania

Italy. Clashes in Milan, Turin and Bologna are framed as "migrant gangs and antifa" ("maranza"). "Who funds the protesters" claims come from both sides. CGIL rallied on 17 October; a general strike is set for 20 November.

Portugal. Coverage stays on housing (about 31% of Portuguese posts are economic grievance). A 3am police charge at Porto's camp injured 37–39 people; "infiltrated agents" claims circulate without evidence.

Belgium. School-blockade copycats in Brussels and Liège. Pravda's Belgian site pushed "Brussels is next" from 12 October.


Albania. Foreign influencers and Russian-aligned channels fold Tirana's student protests into "Europe collapsing".



Italy: Turin school occupations framed around "maranza" (186k views). [Open](#)




Italy: Bologna clashes and "who funds the collectives". [Open](#)




Italian Telegram: "Europe under siege: who is dismantling sovereignty? Foreign money, ideological networks, political Islam". [Open](#)



Portugal: SIC Notícias on the Rossio housing camp. [Open](#)



Telegram (Ukrainian), 18 October: "Europe hit by mass anti-government protests in 8 countries", Belgium included. [Open](#)



Albania: Mario Nawfal, "easy to confuse with Paris, but this is Albania". [Open](#)

Is there a cross-country core?

We looked for accounts active on several countries or incidents. 511 accounts posted at least twice about three or more countries; removing media and aggregators leaves 293, and a strict core of 88 non-media accounts.

The core is 74 Telegram channels, 6 Facebook pages, 5 X accounts and 3 YouTube channels; mostly Russian- (26) and English-language (19).

They link Milan (65 accounts), Limoges (58), Brussels (52) and Tirana (49). Only 2 mention Maricarmen: the Spanish housing story stayed domestic.

Their volume stepped up on 14 October and peaked on 17 October, but first mentions of each country are not synchronised (at most 9 accounts in the same hour).

Two tight copy-paste clusters: three Dutch "verzet" Telegram channels posting identical texts within about three minutes (highly likely co-managed or auto-crossposting), and a Moldovan and Romanian trio led by sputnikmd_2 (coordination a realistic possibility).

Assessment: the core is likely a shared feed ecosystem of aggregator channels and international influencers reposting the same sources (rntel, CIG_telegram, warcorrespondent107 and others). It is unlikely to be one coordinated network.

09 The mobilisation infrastructure

17octobregiletjaune.net. The interactive map behind the reported jump from 279 to more than 1,025 action points. Its domain, certificate, map tiles, dataset and Telegram channel (@info17octobre, 25,900 members, created 15 September) were set up within about two hours on 14–15 September. It is fronted by Gilets jaunes, Bloquons tout, the 26 September movement and Peuple Révolté. Its petition collects contact data, including from minors, with no privacy notice.

17octobre.app. A separate, later and commercial venture: registered 13 October on a single server, with a bare Belgian address, a paywall, a referral scheme, and one TikTok account plugging it eight times in 35 minutes. It claims users can organise "without being tracked"; its operator can in fact link accounts, payment identities, referral networks and exact route origins. We rate the data-harvesting risk as medium, with no evidence of malicious intent.

Foreign link. None at the hosting, DNS or tracking layer of either site. Any foreign role sits in amplification.



EVIDENCE

17octobre.app landing page, captured 19 October. One TikTok account plugged it in eight comments in 35 minutes on 16 October. [Open original](#)

How the map was pre-loaded with about 9,000 sites

Nobody entered the points by hand, and the site does not use Google Maps. It is built on open-source mapping (Leaflet and Protomaps) over a self-hosted OpenStreetMap tile file, with French government open data merged in by script. Archived copies show it grew in three stages, and the code comments credit each addition to "Ben" (for example "Lycées et enseignement supérieur ajoutés par Ben le 17/10/2026").

Date (archived copy)	Points	What was added
23 September	149	6 refineries, 120 fuel depots, 23 demonstrations
14 October	4,624	2,857 stations, 593 toll plazas, 477 bridges, 184 ports
17 October, 08:17 UTC	9,369	3,834 lycées, 911 higher-education sites (8,982 infrastructure or education sites plus 387 demonstrations)

Layer	Source	How we checked
Railway stations	SNCF open data (gares de voyageurs)	Same record count (2,792) and matching coordinates
Lycées	Annuaire de l'éducation (Ministry of Education)	Coordinates and public/private status match record by record
Refineries, depots	Géorisques register of classified industrial sites	Site IDs re-encode the official register codes
Toll plazas	OpenStreetMap (toll_booth)	593 of 593 within 500 m of an OSM booth; an OSM spelling error was copied over
Fuel stations	DGCCRF fuel-price feed	The file names it as its source
Bridges, ports, higher education	Probably OSM and higher-education open data	Not yet verified

Assessment: a scripted merge of about five public datasets, roughly a day's work per layer, with no paid data. The code reads like a product owner ("Ben") directing a developer or an AI coding assistant. Open data makes the map look official and complete; it does not imply state or foreign support.

10 What else is emerging

The 17 October 1961 anniversary of the Paris massacre of Algerian protesters shares the date; President Tebboune's anniversary message and "une date, deux époques" posts tie the two.


Snapchat: racist police accounts posing as lycéens gave rise to the "Bismillah c'est les ténèbres" slogan, which foreign accounts then recast as Islamist.

A self-styled "Grand Monarque" conspiracy influencer called a rally "behind the Élysée" on 17 October.


Attacks on media: a Euronews crew assaulted by masked individuals and a Spanish RTVE live report interrupted.

Copycat dates: claims that the "uprising" will come to Germany on 31 October (Halloween); school blockades in Hamburg and Berlin.


Recycled footage: AFP debunked 2022 clips; Poland's TVP aired French riot footage beside a Polish protest; users ask Grok to verify clips.




President Tebboune's 17 October 1961 anniversary message, relayed on TikTok. [Open](#)




Racist police accounts posing as lycéens on Snapchat gave rise to the "Bismillah c'est les ténèbres" meme (807k views). [Open](#)



A self-styled "Grand Monarque" calls a rally "derrière l'Élysée" on 17 October (97k views). [Open](#)




"Une équipe d'Euronews agressée par des individus masqués", 17 October. [Open](#)



Protesters interrupt a Spanish TV live report in Paris, 18 October. [Open](#)



LION Media, 14 October: the "uprising" is to come to Germany on 31 October. [Open](#)



TikTok, 18 October: "French students call on German students to take to the streets on 31 October". [Open](#)

11 Topic extraction: what the key actors did with their week

We pulled everything 387 key players and threat actors posted from 11 to 18 October, on X, Telegram and TikTok, not only their posts about the unrest. This shows how much attention each group gave France and what it set it against.

FIGURE 14





Figure 14. Share of all posts by each actor group that concern the unrest, per day. Data: [Data appendix, table 14](#)

State-linked outlets came early and stayed. State media and state-linked accounts spent 8–15% of their output on the unrest every day before the riots, and about 40% on 17 October. Iran's French-language Press TV (34%) and IRNA (37%) were the most focused of any state outlet.


Influencers reacted. Foreign influencers gave France 1–4% of their output until 16 October, then about a quarter on 17 October. The rest of their week was US politics and Israel and Gaza: France was slotted into existing agendas.

Russian-aligned channels framed it through Ukraine. The Rybar network and pro-Kremlin channels spent a third of their non-France output on the war in Ukraine.


French organisers mobilised steadily. Organiser accounts spent 10–17% of their output on the protests every day from 12 October; the mobilisation group OrgaGJxGENZ posted 4,400 Telegram messages in the week.



Press TV Français on Telegram, 17 October: police violence in Paris. [Open](#)



Press TV Français on Telegram, 17 October: Saint-Étienne car incident. [Open](#)



OrgaGJxGENZ on Telegram, 17 October: "Place Bellecour (Lyon) held by the protesters". [Open](#)

12 TikTok: key accounts' own feeds


We scraped the TikTok feeds of key accounts for 11–18 October, verifying official handles by follower count: 416 videos from 23 accounts. 121 videos concerned the unrest, with 24,161,625 views. Le Pen, Abascal, Ventura, Vannacci and Weidel have no official TikTok account we could find.

Account	Videos	About the unrest	Views on unrest videos
@cnews	40	32	16,647,000
@sarah_knafo	37	13	1,789,500
@rnational_off	40	11	1,344,722
@jordanbardella	7	2	1,274,400
@oe24at	40	7	947,300
@jlmelenchon	10	2	616,000
@florianphilippot	6	6	571,935
@zemmour_eric	18	6	540,555
@peuplerevolte	27	27	185,975
@franceinsoumise	9	4	105,500
@fratelliditalia	23	4	64,436
@matteosalviniufficiale	6	2	52,900
@vox_espana	40	1	10,600
@frontieresmedia	28	2	7,708
@visegrad24	20	2	3,094
@realdonaldtrump	1	0	0
@afdfraktionimbundestag	10	0	0
@nigel_farage	20	0	0
@mlp_officiel	1	0	0
@chega.oficial	18	0	0


CNews owns the TikTok riot story. Its top clip ("la mobilisation a viré au chaos") drew 8 million views, more than the rest of these accounts' unrest videos combined. Coverage centres on looting, fire and the Élysée.

Politicians used TikTok for blame, not reporting. Jordan Bardella's riot video (1.1 million views) frames the violence as the work of a left-wing MP's "friends"; his other videos that week were about Ceuta, borders and 2027.


Foreign framing came through outlets. Trump, Mario Nawfal and other foreign accounts posted no unrest videos in their own feeds; Austria's oe24 ("Frankreich in Flammen") did.



CNews on TikTok, 17 October: "la mobilisation a viré au chaos" (8 million views). [Open](#)



Jordan Bardella on TikTok: "Voilà ce que les copains de ce député de gauche font aux forces de l'ordre" (1.1 million views). [Open](#)



oe24 (Austria) on TikTok: "Frankreich in Flammen!". [Open](#)

13 YouTube: the video layer


A dedicated YouTube sweep (24 searches in nine languages) returned 667 relevant videos with 45,246,135 views. Most views go to mainstream news, but the most-watched single framing came from US conservative television.

Channel	Videos	Views	Subscribers
Fox News	7	3,223,774	15,500,000
franceinfo	17	1,903,174	1,070,000
HugoDécrypte - Actus du jour	3	1,741,665	3,820,000
Le Parisien	6	1,735,360	2,120,000
BFMTV	15	1,676,784	2,700,000
BBC News	6	1,473,953	20,200,000
Brut	6	1,334,475	2,880,000
Kanał Zero	5	1,092,043	2,380,000
TF1 INFO	6	1,021,243	1,750,000
FRANCE 24	11	950,909	8,740,000
CNEWS	11	912,658	646,000
Le Huffington Post	3	854,943	1,580,000


Fox News set the "who is behind it" frame. "Fox News EXPOSES who is behind France student protests" (1.45 million views, 12 October) and "This is an INTERNATIONAL movement to DESTABILIZE the West" (596,000) predate the "organised communist network" claim. A 13 October X post linking a Brussels Signal article on a "communist network" tags Pat Condell, Dinesh D'Souza, Turning Point USA and Victor Davis Hanson.

Poland's Kanał Zero carried the migration frame. Four videos with about 1.07 million views, led by "FRANCJA: MIGRACJA, ISLAM, POLICJA. REWOLUCJA NA ULICACH".


An Indian right-wing video ecosystem. The Jaipur Dialogues ("France is Burning | Why Regime Change Failed in India") mirrors the Indian account cluster on X.




Fox News, 12 October: "Fox News EXPOSES who is behind France student protests" (1.45 million views). [Open](#)



Fox News, 17 October: "This is an INTERNATIONAL movement to DESTABILIZE the West" (596k views). [Open](#)



Kanał Zero (Poland), 13 October: "FRANCJA: MIGRACJA, ISLAM, POLICJA. REWOLUCJA NA ULICACH". [Open](#)



The Jaipur Dialogues on YouTube, 18 October: "France is Burning | Why Regime Change Failed in India", with an event registration link. [Open](#)

Drift Theory: an AI content farm that caught the wave

The video "France's Protests Just Burned a 143-Year-Old Town Hall — Here's What It Means" (17 October, 2 min 38 s) had 244,000 views when rechecked, on a US channel created on 6 August 2026 with 379 subscribers. This one video is about 98% of the channel's lifetime views; its other 133 videos mostly get 1–485 views.


Content-farm signs: about 30 long videos plus Shorts in three days on unrelated topics (sports, stocks, weather, satellites), every title on the "— Here's What It Means" template, identical disclaimer and sources blocks, still images, and live title A/B tests.

No ads, links or memberships yet, but this video alone gives it roughly the watch hours YouTube requires for monetisation.

Comments look organic and are dominated by "not students / Islam / invasion" reframing; peer channels (Macro Obscura, The Umbra Files) show the same one-off spike on this topic.

Assessment: an AI-assisted content farm is highly likely; artificial boosting is unlikely (algorithmic pickup is likely); a coordinated political network is a remote chance.

Part of an industry. Drift Theory is one example of a wider trade in “decline” content made abroad for European audiences. BBC Panorama traced dozens of Facebook and Instagram accounts pushing AI videos of a declining, “Islamised” UK to operators in Sri Lanka, Vietnam, the Maldives and the US, one with more than 20 million views,⁵ and Benjamin Strick found 46 Facebook pages and groups (about 900,000 followers), including a French “patriot” page, managed from Sri Lanka and posting AI imagery on immigration and identity.⁶ France’s riots were ready-made material for this market.




EVIDENCE

Drift Theory on YouTube, 17 October: 192,876 views on a channel with 337 subscribers. [Open original](#)

14 What audiences said: the comment layer

We collected 12,839 comments under the 393 most-watched unrest videos (300 TikTok, 120 YouTube targets): up to 30 per TikTok video and the top 50 per YouTube video. We analysed the conversation, not the individuals: commenters are hashed and never named.

FIGURE 15

Figure 15. Share of comments using the migration / Islam frame, by comment language and platform. Data: [Data appendix, table 15](#)

The same split as the posts. French comments are about prices, lycée funding, police injuries and taking part ("Nos lycées sont délabrés"; "une main, un œil de perdu"). English, German and Portuguese comments carry the migration frame ("These are not student riots this is an Islamic takeover"; "keine Schülerproteste").


Spectacle more than outrage in English. The most-liked English comments romanticise the protests ("peak French culture"). Civil-war comments are few (0.8%) but over-liked: they draw 2.9% of all likes.

"Same here": envy, not mobilisation. German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian commenters compare France with home ("Wir in Deutschland nicken nur"; Vox voting intent; "La noi..." in Romanian), but do not call for action.

False claims barely reach the comments. None of the tracked false claims (Greta, 30,000 looters, Limoges attribution, the Trump quote) appears; "staged / AI / fake" accusations are 0.5% of comments. Disinformation lives on X, Telegram and in outlet framing, not in what audiences repeat under mainstream videos.

No coordinated commenting. 12,839 comments came from about 12,000 different commenters; only three texts appear under three or more videos, each from one or two people. Assessment: comment brigading on these videos is unlikely.

FIGURE 16



Channel · comments analysed

Figure 16. Share of comments using the migration / Islam frame, by channel (100 or more comments). Data: [Data appendix, table 16](#)


The audience follows the outlet: Fox News (6%) and Kanal Zero (4%) comment sections carry the migration frame; franceinfo, BFMTV, TF1 and Brut sit at 0–1%.

15 The civilisational frame as a fundraising funnel


For US and anglophone right-wing media, French riot footage was the top of a funnel. None ran a France-specific appeal; the footage carried a migration, Islam or "globalist" frame, and the channel's standing monetisation converted the traffic.

Channel	France content	How it converts the traffic
PragerU (3.5M subscribers)	Short: "'Religion of peace' rioting across France"	Links to an email-gated "Islam 101" course asking the Short's exact question; donations, petitions, memberships
Fox News	"EXPOSES who is behind..." (1.5M); "DESTABILIZE the West" (655k)	"Become a Fox News Patriot" paid membership in every description
GB News	"Brussels BURNS... immigration" (520k)	"Friend of GB News" membership; a sponsored VPN read and pinned affiliate link
reallygraceful (406k)	"France Was Only the Beginning": Agenda 2030, "replacement migration"	Book, Patreon, Buy Me a Coffee, memberships, backup channels on Rumble, Bitchute and Gab
The Jaipur Dialogues	"France is Burning"	Bank, UPI and PayPal details in the description, an action fund, paid events

Assessment: migration/Islam reframing of the protests is almost certain; that this traffic feeds membership, lead-capture and donation monetisation is highly likely; France-specific fundraising appeals are unlikely in the material reviewed.



PragerU Short, 16 October: "'Religion of peace' rioting across France". [Open](#)



reallygraceful, 17 October: "France Was Only the Beginning". [Open](#)

16 CIB review

We tested the leads from our first round of analysis for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB): hyperactive accounts, copy-paste clusters, Russian-language Telegram, the two X clusters, and comments.

What we tested	What we found	Assessment (PHIA)
Doppelganger tracker (Meltwater)	639 posts in 22 synchronised waves, 2 Sep–14 Oct, from account cohorts created within days; 23 of 34 redirect domains on one IP	Almost certain CIB; highly likely Doppelganger
30 hyperactive X accounts (up to 669 posts a day)	Daily 7–12 hour quiet gaps (human sleep); no pair reposts in sync; one account posted 22 reposts in about 30 milliseconds	CIB unlikely; automation likely for one account
920 copy-paste clusters	Mostly syndication (regional media groups, cross-posting bridges); a Tirana "police brutality" call-out copied by 5 accounts in 9 minutes	Remote chance to unlikely
Russian-language Telegram	Feeder families (banki_oil, oleg_blokhin, apwagner) with fixed follow-on channels; Pravda Poland relays olej_w_glowie 163/163 times	Likely for feeder families; highly likely for the Pravda relay
Indian right-wing cluster (526)	Organic fandom around Indian hubs; peaked before the riots	CIB unlikely
realMaalouf / Condell / BRICSinfo cluster (2,591)	Organic reposting of a few hubs; BRICSinfo mirrored to Telegram within an hour	CIB unlikely; mirroring a realistic possibility
Cross-country core (88)	Shared feeds; one Dutch trio posting identical texts within minutes	Unlikely as one network; Dutch trio highly likely co-managed
Comments (12,839)	12,000 distinct commenters; three repeated texts	Brigading unlikely

Caveat: our X keyword data was collected in bursts, so "many accounts within five minutes" patterns in it are not evidence; we tested synchrony only on continuous account timelines. To raise confidence we need full retweeter lists for the top hub posts and Telegram channel metadata (creation dates, admins).

17 Key actor profiles (X and TikTok)

Actor	Posts by platform	Unrest posts (share)	First unrest post (Oct, UTC)	Main frames / note
Marine Le Pen	x 151 (12 unrest)	12 (8%)	10-14 15:16	economic grievance 2, far left blame 2, police violence 1, civil war collapse 1
Jordan Bardella	tiktok 7 (2 unrest); x 65 (7 unrest)	9 (12%)	10-16 13:29	economic grievance 2, far left blame 2, civil war collapse 1, heritage destroyed 1
Rassemblement National	tiktok 49 (11 unrest); x 390 (45 unrest)	56 (13%)	10-12 07:48	far left blame 9, civil war collapse 3, migration islam blame 2, economic grievance 1
Éric Zemmour	tiktok 18 (6 unrest); x 50 (8 unrest)	14 (21%)	10-13 07:49	migration islam blame 6, far left blame 4, revolution insurrection 2, civil war collapse 1
Sarah Knafo	tiktok 37 (4 unrest); x 71 (7 unrest)	11 (10%)	10-12 12:06	migration islam blame 2
Reconquête	x 20 (2 unrest)	2 (10%)	10-14 09:34	
Marion Maréchal	x 35 (10 unrest)	10 (29%)	10-13 11:46	migration islam blame 6, far left blame 5, civil war collapse 2, heritage destroyed 1
Florian Philippot	tiktok 6 (6 unrest); x 85 (14 unrest)	20 (22%)	10-12 06:24	civil war collapse 6, macron illegitimacy 2, ukraine war link 2, far left blame 1
Éric Ciotti	x 121 (47 unrest)	47 (39%)	10-11 11:40	far left blame 12, migration islam blame 4, civil war collapse 4, economic grievance 3
Giorgia Meloni	tiktok 7 (0 unrest); x 13 (2 unrest)	2 (10%)	10-17 17:43	
Matteo Salvini	tiktok 6 (1 unrest); x 7 (3 unrest)	4 (31%)	10-17 15:40	migration islam blame 2, far left blame 1
Lega	x 62 (7 unrest)	7 (11%)	10-11 14:20	migration islam blame 5, far left blame 1
Fratelli d'Italia	tiktok 23 (3 unrest)	3 (13%)	10-16 12:27	
Santiago Abascal	x 97 (8 unrest)	8 (8%)	10-12 15:13	
Vox	tiktok 40 (7 unrest); x 231 (9 unrest)	16 (6%)	10-12 08:43	economic grievance 5, migration islam blame 1
André Ventura	x 25 (2 unrest)	0 (0%)		No unrest content found; posts on Patriots meetings and Portuguese politics
Chega	tiktok 18 (0 unrest); x 26 (1 unrest)	1 (2%)	10-12 21:19	economic grievance 1
Alice Weidel	x 24 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		
AfD	tiktok 10 (0 unrest); x 13 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		
Maximilian Krah	x 109 (4 unrest)	4 (4%)	10-15 08:42	police violence 1
Geert Wilders	tiktok 4 (0 unrest); x 29 (5 unrest)	5 (15%)	10-14 17:52	migration islam blame 3, civil war collapse 2, foreign interference claim 2
Viktor Orbán	x 6 (2 unrest)	2 (33%)	10-14 18:26	
Péter Magyar	x 42 (2 unrest)	2 (5%)	10-18 09:47	heritage destroyed 1

Actor	Posts by platform	Unrest posts (share)	First unrest post (Oct, UTC)	Main frames / note
Nigel Farage	tiktok 20 (1 unrest); x 38 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		No unrest content in his X or TikTok feeds; his week was UK asylum ('invasion')
Reform UK	x 86 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		
Donald Trump	mastodon 26 (0 unrest); tiktok 1 (0 unrest); x 11 (1 unrest)	0 (0%)		No unrest post in captured X/Truth Social mirror (ends 17 Oct 18:08); his 18 Oct 'France is burning' post is outside our capture
JD Vance	x 11 (1 unrest)	1 (9%)	10-18 01:21	migration islam blame 1
Elon Musk	x 518 (2 unrest)	2 (0%)	10-18 14:43	
Tommy Robinson	x 167 (29 unrest)	29 (17%)	10-11 04:24	migration islam blame 9, heritage destroyed 3, economic grievance 1, civil war collapse 1
Radio Genoa	x 469 (86 unrest)	86 (18%)	10-11 06:49	civil war collapse 34, migration islam blame 6, media distrust 4, far left blame 2
Visegrad24	tiktok 20 (2 unrest); x 350 (88 unrest)	90 (24%)	10-11 16:05	migration islam blame 25, far left blame 7, heritage destroyed 4, media distrust 2
Mario Nawfal	tiktok 5 (0 unrest); x 2293 (155 unrest)	155 (7%)	10-11 11:00	civil war collapse 17, ukraine war link 13, economic grievance 10, police violence 6
Wall Street Apes	x 138 (7 unrest)	7 (5%)	10-11 01:39	migration islam blame 5, far left blame 2, economic grievance 1, civil war collapse 1
End Wokeness	x 91 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		
Peter Imanuelsen	x 24 (5 unrest)	5 (21%)	10-14 12:21	far left blame 4, revolution insurrection 1, media distrust 1
Eva Vlaar	x 40 (2 unrest)	2 (5%)	10-11 12:54	
Tucker Carlson	x 8 (0 unrest)	0 (0%)		
Jackson Hinkle	x 313 (3 unrest)	3 (1%)	10-15 16:53	ukraine war link 1, foreign interference claim 1
RT	x 1206 (46 unrest)	46 (4%)	10-11 05:26	police violence 6, ukraine war link 4, economic grievance 2, civil war collapse 2
Sputnik	x 161 (2 unrest)	2 (1%)	10-12 10:50	ukraine war link 2, civil war collapse 1, macron illegitimacy 1, foreign interference claim 1
Russian MFA	x 93 (2 unrest)	2 (2%)	10-16 12:20	police violence 1
CNews	tiktok 40 (31 unrest)	31 (78%)	10-16 07:00	economic grievance 5, far left blame 2, civil war collapse 2, heritage destroyed 2
Frontières	tiktok 28 (1 unrest)	1 (4%)	10-14 13:17	
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	tiktok 10 (1 unrest); x 99 (17 unrest)	18 (17%)	10-11 14:47	far left blame 6, economic grievance 3, police violence 1
La France insoumise	telegram 149 (90 unrest); tiktok 9 (4 unrest)	94 (59%)	10-11 13:49	far left blame 90, economic grievance 68, police violence 30, macron illegitimacy 6
Peuple Révolté	telegram 34 (33 unrest); tiktok 27 (27 unrest)	60 (98%)	10-12 19:43	police violence 12, revolution insurrection 7, economic grievance 2, macron illegitimacy 2
Emmanuel Macron	x 13 (1 unrest)	1 (8%)	10-17 17:48	civil war collapse 1

French far right ran the week, not just the weekend. Ciotti, Marion Maréchal, Philippot and Zemmour were on the unrest from 11–14 October; RN framed it mainly as far-left blame.

Foreign right-wing leaders mostly stayed home. Meloni, Abascal, Vox, Chega, the AfD, Farage and Reform UK gave France little of their output; Salvini and Wilders were the exceptions, both through a migration lens.

The agitators did the cross-border work. Visegrad24, Radio Genoa, Tommy Robinson and Peter Imanuelsen were on France from 11 October with civil-war and migration frames.

US amplification was a late, single shot. Vance and Musk each posted once or twice on France, on 18 October; their reach, not their volume, is what matters.

18 The AI layer

AI ran through this case in three roles: a target to be seeded, a tool for making content, and the referee people turned to.

The target: writing for machines.

- The Pravda network's 1,018 articles were not written to be read. 272 items ran on two to five of its sites within minutes.
- Alice.io researchers have shown why that matters. When a claim is republished across many domains, AI tools “encounter not one source but many repeating the same claim, creating an illusion of corroboration”.¹¹
- The EEAS's latest threat report says the network behind Pravda, Portal Kombat, “is suspected of conducting Large Language Model (LLM) grooming”. It also found AI tactics in 27% of the FIMI incidents it detected in 2025, with AI-related cases up from 41 in 2024 to 147.¹²
- It already reaches the output. NewsGuard found a chatbot citing France.News-Pravda.com.¹ A peer-reviewed study in *Nature* found that government control of the media “already influences the output of LLMs via their training data”, shown for China's state media.¹³ That Pravda content has entered specific models' training data is not yet demonstrated.

The tool: AI-made content for a market.

- Drift Theory's one AI-assisted Limoges video accounts for about 98% of the channel's lifetime views (section 13).
- It is part of an industry selling “decline” narratives to European audiences.^{5,6} One UK-facing page, “Britain Today” (192,000 followers), earned around \$1,500 a month through Meta's monetisation tools from content made with Grok, ChatGPT and Google's Whisk.¹⁴
- AI on its own rarely finds an audience. Anthropic found that most content from the nine influence operations it disrupted “drew little or no authentic engagement”, and that “the widest authentic reach occurred where state media outlets were the distribution mechanism”.¹⁵ That is the Pravda model: AI-scale production, distributed through a ready-made state media network.

The referee: asking the machine.

- 90 posts in our sample tagged @grok to settle questions about the riots: to verify a claim, explain the violence or compare the “demographics” of rioters. 52 were in English and 20 in French. A further 80 posts dismissed real footage as AI-generated. Our X data is a sample, so both are minimum counts.
 - Chatbots are poor referees. In Demos’s tests during the 2026 Scottish election window, “one third (34.1%) of responses across chatbots contained factual errors”, and one in five UK adults had used a chatbot or AI search for election information.¹⁶
-

Assessment. Calling something “AI” is no longer a rebuttal: audiences increasingly judge content by whether it feels right, not by where it came from. Resonance has replaced provenance. Whoever shapes the sources AI systems retrieve shapes the answer the next person gets.

DISRUPT assessment.

We applied the Prepare phase of the DISRUPT framework: a case moves to disruption when at least one assessment question can be answered "yes" with at least 80% certainty ("highly likely" or above) on the PHIA Probability Yardstick, explained below.

Case	Inauthentic behaviour	Legality	Attribution	Imminent risk	Foreign interference	Status
Pravda network amplification	Highly likely (automated relay)	Realistic possibility	Highly likely (known network)	Unlikely	Highly likely	Highly likely: action recommended
RT mirror domain (rt-english.com)	n/a	Highly likely breach (EU sanctions)	Almost certain (RT)	Unlikely	Almost certain	Highly likely: action recommended
Russian Telegram feeder families	Likely	Unknown	Realistic possibility	Unlikely	Realistic possibility	More evidence needed
17octobre.app	Unknown	Realistic possibility (GDPR)	Unknown operator	Realistic possibility	No evidence	Legal review recommended
Unsubstantiated Limoges attributions	Unknown	Unlikely	Mixed domestic/foreign	Realistic possibility	Partial	Pre-bunking recommended
Doppelganger network (2 Sep–14 Oct)	Almost certain (bot network)	Realistic possibility (EU sanctions on Doppelganger operators)	Highly likely (Doppelganger)	Unlikely	Highly likely	Highly likely: action recommended
Drift Theory content farm	Highly likely (AI farm)	Unlikely	Unknown operator	Unlikely	Remote chance	Platform notice recommended

The PHIA Probability Yardstick

The Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment (PHIA) yardstick is the UK government's standard scale for expressing how likely a judgement is to be true. Each phrase maps to a probability range, so that "likely" means the same thing in every A4E product and to every partner. The gaps between ranges are deliberate: they stop judgements sitting on a boundary. It describes our confidence in a judgement, not how serious the threat is.

Term	Probability	How we use it here
Remote chance	≤ 5%	We found nothing pointing this way
Highly unlikely	10–20%	Weak signals contradicted by stronger evidence
Unlikely	25–35%	Some signals, but the evidence points the other way
Realistic possibility	40–50%	Credible, but not yet more likely than not
Likely / probably	55–75%	More likely than not on the evidence held
Highly likely	80–90%	Strong, consistent evidence: the DISRUPT threshold for action
Almost certain	≥ 95%	Only an implausible alternative explanation remains

Recommended measures

- **Platforms and providers.** Hosting, registrar and CDN providers should act on rt-english.com and Pravda mirrors; X should review the Doppelganger account cohorts; registrars should review the redirect domains; Telegram should review the relay channels; YouTube should review the content-farm pattern.
- **Authorities.** Sanctions and FIMI authorities should assess the RT mirror and Pravda timing data; data-protection authorities should review 17octobre.app.
- **AI providers.** Treat documented FIMI domains, including the Pravda network and RT mirrors, as low-trust sources in retrieval and search, and require independent corroboration before presenting their claims as fact.
- **Pre-bunking.** Recycled footage and the “who is behind it” frame should be pre-bunked before 2 November (French schools return) and 5 November (strike), with attention to the 31 October and 11 November dates.

Strategic implication.

The grievance is real and local; the manipulation is in the translation. Responses that treat the protests as foreign-made will miss the point and feed the “state repression” frame. The opening is to expose the amplification layer, which is measurable and, for RT and Pravda, actionable now.

The pattern is not unique to France. In Canada, researchers found Russia’s Storm-1516 and the Pravda network (67 articles) amplifying Alberta separatist narratives while pro-Trump US influencers and officials promoted the same cause openly.¹⁰ A4E’s own Moldova investigation documented a Russian operation using a delegation of US, British and Canadian religious-conservative media figures to reach voters.¹¹ Russian state operations and the anglophone right need not coordinate to converge on the same local grievance.

Watch.

Date	Signal
31 Oct	Claimed "uprising" in Germany; school-blockade copycats in DE and BE
~2 Nov	French schools return; lycée mobilisation may restart
3 Nov	US midterms: expect the France "third world" frame in US campaigning
5 Nov	French public- and private-sector strike
11 Nov	Spanish housing general strike
20 Nov	CGIL general strike, Italy
29 Nov	Spanish general election

Method, data quality and limits.

Sources: Meltwater (news, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube, Bluesky, forums; X excluded because author identity is withheld), Exorde (X, TikTok, Instagram, Threads, YouTube, Reddit), TelepathyDB (Telegram) and Apify (TikTok feeds, YouTube search, and TikTok and YouTube comments).

Exorde sample, expanded: after review we added 112,674 Exorde posts (place or leader term AND unrest term, six language groups, up to 6,000 a day each). The median French day now holds about 4,185 relevant Exorde posts and the median English day about 4,188, against real volumes above 100,000 a day, so Exorde remains a sample. The core findings held with the larger sample (migration blame 3.0% in French against 18.7% in English).

Russian-operation trackers: A4E's standing Meltwater searches for Doppelganger, Operation Overload and Storm-1516, plus a new French Overload search, run for 11–18 October. Meltwater withholds X text, so post text was recovered from public X embeds; posts from suspended accounts could not be read.

Expansion posts count only if they also match our relevance lexicon, because loose pairs such as "France" + "guerre" pull in other wars.

Comments: 12,839 TikTok and YouTube comments, the full allowance of our collection plan (about 30 per TikTok video, top 50 per YouTube video), analysed as conversation, never as individuals.

Narratives were tagged with multilingual keyword lexicons and checked against samples; comment themes were also read through unsupervised clusters. Portuguese data contains Brazilian content; content farms inflate French volume.

Scores rank accounts for analyst review and are not attributions. Probability language follows the PHIA yardstick.

Screenshots were captured on 18–19 October with headless Chromium from public views; each image links to the original, and each has a URL, UTC timestamp and checksum in the case evidence store. Further examples are available to researchers on request.

DISARM tagging

We tagged the behaviours of the operations we assessed as manipulative using the **DISARM Red Framework** (DISARM Foundation master data, version of 10 February 2025). Tags describe observed behaviour, not intent. We tag only operations assessed as state-linked or inauthentic; media outlets and political actors are not tagged.

Operation	Behaviour observed	DISARM techniques
Doppelganger (X)	Turned cost-of-living anger against Ukraine aid and recalled the 2018 Gilets jaunes revolt	T0081.006 Identify Wedge Issues T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives T0135.004 Polarise
Doppelganger (X)	Bot accounts in creation cohorts with templated female personas	T0146.007 Automated Account Asset T0150.001 Newly Created Asset T0143.002 Fabricated Persona T0144.002 Persona Template
Doppelganger (X)	Synchronised multi-language waves (FR/DE/EN/PL)	T0049.003 Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting T0101 Create Localised Content
Doppelganger (X)	Links through throwaway .ch redirect domains to articles branded as DER SPIEGEL	T0149.004 Redirecting Domain Asset T0143.003 Impersonated Persona
Doppelganger (X)	Unrelated video attached to political posts	T0129.002 Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative
Pravda network	Automated reposts of Telegram, RT and TASS items on 28 inauthentic news sites	T0098.002 Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites T0049.007 Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives T0084.004 Appropriate Content
Pravda network	Same item on two to five sites within minutes	T0119 Cross-Posting
Pravda network	Volume aimed at search engines and AI chatbots	T0049.008 Generate Information Pollution T0102.003 Exploit Data Voids
Pravda network	78% of output after the riots	T0068 Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
RT	Mirror domain rt-english.com	T0149.001 Domain Asset
Russian-language Telegram relays	Pravda Poland relays one channel 163 times out of 163; fixed feeder chains	T0049.003 Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting T0119 Cross-Posting
Limoges attribution claim	Immigrants or Muslims blamed for the fire without evidence; spread by forwards and copy-paste	T0068 Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis T0023.001 Reframe Context T0118 Amplify Existing Narrative T0084.001 Use Copy-paste
Drift Theory content farm	AI-assisted template videos on unrelated topics; clickbait titles on a new channel	T0016 Create Clickbait T0129.002 Generate Content Unrelated to Narrative T0150.001 Newly Created Asset

Notes.

1. NewsGuard (L. Marchl, I. Chomnalez, I. Blachez), "**Anthropic's AI Chatbot Is Leaning More on Russian and Iranian Propaganda Sources**", 4 May 2026.
2. NewsGuard (McKenzie Sadeghi, Isis Blachez), "**A well-funded Moscow-based global 'news' network has infected Western artificial intelligence tools worldwide with Russian propaganda**", 6 March 2025.
3. Annie Newport and Nina Jankowicz (American Sunlight Project), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "**Russian networks flood the Internet with propaganda, aiming to corrupt AI chatbots**", 26 March 2025.
4. CBC News, "**Russia and U.S. amplifying Alberta separatist narratives to stoke division, distrust: report**", May 2026.
5. BBC News (Marianna Spring), "**Overseas fakers using AI videos to push a narrative of UK decline, BBC finds**", 15 May 2026.
6. Benjamin Strick, "**Fake Flags: the Facebook network rebranding itself as Australian, British, French and Canadian communities**", 10 August 2026.
7. Alethea, "**Operation Doppelgänger: Inside the Russian Influence Network Targeting the US Midterms, Israel's Election, and France's 2027 Race**", 16 October 2026.
8. Global Disinformation Index, "**Russia benefitting from Data Voids to influence LLMs**", 12 October 2026.
9. Bloomberg, "**Leaked Files Show Russia's Plan to Influence AI and Search Results**", 23 June 2026.
10. Alliance for Securing Democracy (German Marshall Fund), Authoritarian Interference Tracker, "**Russian state media, including RT and Sputnik, amplify and heavily promote the Yellow Vest protest movement in France on social media**", incident record, 2018–19 (archived 26 November 2025).
11. J. Begeer (Alice), "**Sanctioned Today, Cited Tomorrow**", 25 March 2026.
12. EEAS, "**4th Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats**", March 2026.
13. H. Waight, E. Yang, Y. Yuan, S. Messing, "**State media control influences large language models**", *Nature*, July 2026.
14. N. McIntyre, M. Khan, M. Sellman (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism), "**The devout Muslim making a living from Islamophobic AI slop**", 5 May 2026.
15. Anthropic, "**Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026**", September 2026.
16. Demos, "**Electoral Hallucinations: Safeguarding UK elections in the world of LLMs and AI chatbots**", 20 May 2026.
17. Alliance4Europe, with Context.ro, Debunk.org and VSquare, "**Overloading the Moldovan Elections**", April 2026.

Data appendix: the numbers behind each chart.

Each table holds the full data behind the figure with the same number, so readers can check or rebuild each chart.

Percentages are shares of posts (or comments) unless the column says otherwise. The same tables are available as CSV files on request.

Table 1. Posts per day by source, 11–18 October (Meltwater sources; Exorde and Telegram are samples).

Date	News, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube, Bluesky, forums
11 Oct	7467
12 Oct	7283
13 Oct	9736
14 Oct	9114
15 Oct	8747
16 Oct	12,377
17 Oct	29,869
18 Oct	35,787

Table 2. Share of each day's relevant posts by narrative.

Date	Economic grievance	Migration / Islam blame	Civil war / collapse	Police violence	Ukraine war link	Heritage destroyed
11	11.5	10.3	4.0	2.1	2.9	0.2
12	11.6	10.5	3.5	2.0	3.1	0.2
13	12.6	6.4	4.5	2.9	3.0	0.3
14	13.1	8.7	1.9	3.5	4.7	0.2
15	16.4	9.7	2.0	4.0	5.5	0.2
16	17.0	6.4	2.9	4.4	4.6	0.2
17	11.4	4.4	5.3	6.3	2.6	3.1
18	10.1	9.7	8.9	2.9	2.2	5.5

Table 3. Share of posts using the migration / Islam frame, by language.

Language	% of posts
en	18.7
pl	12.6
de	8.2
nl	8.2
ru	7.6
it	7.0
fr	3.0
es	2.5
pt	1.9

Table 4. Posts about the main flashpoints from home-language and foreign-language accounts.

Place	Home-language posts	Foreign-language posts	Foreign-language share
Paris	14,434	18,371	0.6
Milano	6,114	2,377	0.3
Marseille	4,022	3,290	0.5
Limoges	2,174	4,619	0.7
Lyon	3,394	3,133	0.5
Madrid	3,542	625	0.1
Roma	2,893	592	0.2
Torino	2,762	566	0.2
Bruxelles	439	2,002	0.8
Bologna	1,463	688	0.3
Lisboa	1,616	429	0.2
Bordeaux	1,177	721	0.4
Tirana	139	1,598	0.9
Saint-Denis	1,083	464	0.3

Table 5. How posts about the Limoges fire were framed, by language.

Language	Civil war collapse	Heritage destroyed	Migration islam blame
fr	14.1	68.5	6.0
en	44.0	89.0	15.5
de	21.7	93.0	18.8
ru	7.7	50.8	13.1
es	3.4	16.4	2.4

Table 6. Pravda network articles about the unrest, per six hours.

Date	Articles
2026-10-11 06:00	3
2026-10-11 12:00	5
2026-10-11 18:00	10
2026-10-12 00:00	3
2026-10-12 06:00	6
2026-10-12 12:00	15
2026-10-12 18:00	9
2026-10-13 06:00	15
2026-10-13 12:00	26
2026-10-13 18:00	11
2026-10-14 00:00	5
2026-10-14 06:00	17
2026-10-14 12:00	17
2026-10-14 18:00	5
2026-10-15 00:00	1
2026-10-15 06:00	6
2026-10-15 12:00	25
2026-10-15 18:00	6
2026-10-16 00:00	3
2026-10-16 06:00	7
2026-10-16 12:00	17
2026-10-16 18:00	11
2026-10-17 00:00	5
2026-10-17 06:00	38
2026-10-17 12:00	83
2026-10-17 18:00	151
2026-10-18 00:00	51
2026-10-18 06:00	127
2026-10-18 12:00	279
2026-10-18 18:00	61

Table 7. Pravda network articles by site (subdomain of news-pravda.com), top 10.

Site	Articles
france	364
francais	193
news-pravda.com (main)	134
spanish	81
usa	45
deutsch	37
italy	29
belgium	21
spain	19
germany	17

Table 8. Pravda network articles by language of the article.

	Articles
French	435
English	386
Spanish	96
German	57
Other	44

Table 9. Doppelganger posts on X in synchronised multi-language waves, per day.

	French	German	English	Polish
2026-09-01	0	0	0	0
2026-09-02	8	8	8	0
2026-09-03	19	20	10	0
2026-09-04	0	0	0	0
2026-09-05	0	0	0	0
2026-09-06	0	0	0	0
2026-09-07	9	4	5	0
2026-09-08	10	9	0	7
2026-09-09	8	8	8	0
2026-09-10	0	0	0	0
2026-09-11	5	8	10	0
2026-09-12	0	0	0	0
2026-09-13	0	0	0	0

	French	German	English	Polish
2026-09-14	0	0	0	0
2026-09-15	6	10	0	4
2026-09-16	0	0	0	0
2026-09-17	0	0	0	0
2026-09-18	0	0	0	0
2026-09-19	0	0	0	0
2026-09-20	0	0	0	0
2026-09-21	0	0	0	0
2026-09-22	0	0	0	0
2026-09-23	0	0	0	0
2026-09-24	0	0	0	0
2026-09-25	9	8	6	0
2026-09-26	8	8	2	0
2026-09-27	0	0	0	0
2026-09-28	10	8	10	10
2026-09-29	0	0	8	0
2026-09-30	0	0	0	0
2026-10-01	18	22	13	0
2026-10-02	20	9	20	0
2026-10-03	0	0	0	0
2026-10-04	0	0	8	0
2026-10-05	10	10	19	0
2026-10-06	0	0	0	0
2026-10-07	10	10	10	10
2026-10-08	30	30	37	0
2026-10-09	20	20	10	0
2026-10-10	0	0	0	0
2026-10-11	0	0	0	0
2026-10-12	0	0	0	0
2026-10-13	0	0	9	0
2026-10-14	14	9	0	0
2026-10-15	0	0	0	0
2026-10-16	0	0	0	0
2026-10-17	0	0	0	0
2026-10-18	0	0	0	0

	French	German	English	Polish
2026-10-19	0	0	0	0

Table 10. First post by each Known Actor using the migration / Islam frame.

Account	First post (UTC)
RadioGenoa	2026-10-11 13:35
ZemmourEric	2026-10-13 08:55
WallStreetApes	2026-10-13 19:39
MarionMarechal	2026-10-14 08:25
visegrad24	2026-10-14 12:03
TRobinsonNewEra	2026-10-14 18:58
LegaSalvini	2026-10-15 11:20
MarioNawfal	2026-10-15 12:40
eciotti	2026-10-15 14:46
matteosalvinimi	2026-10-17 17:55
JDVance	2026-10-18 01:21
geertwilderspvv	2026-10-18 18:18

Table 11. How much more (or less) often each narrative appears on each platform than on average.

Platform	Migration islam blame	Civil war collapse	Heritage destroyed	Police violence	Ukraine war link	Foreign interference claim	Macron illegitimacy	Revolution insurrection	Economic grievance	mobilise
telegram	1.2	1.2	2.9	1.8	4.3	3.1	2.9	2.0	1.0	1.1
x	1.6	1.1	0.6	0.7	0.5	1.4	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.5
facebook	1.6	2.5	2.9	2.4	1.7	0.8	2.3	2.2	2.5	3.9
reddit	3.6	0.8	0.5	0.9	4.3	3.0	2.4	6.7	1.8	0.7
youtube	1.0	1.6	1.3	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.5	1.6	1.0	0.6
tiktok	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.4	1.0
instagram	1.6	0.6	0.8	1.0	2.2	0.5	1.6	0.8	1.7	1.6
bluesky	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.7
news	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.9

Table 12. Share of relevant posts by platform.

	Posts
X	71,534
News	66,223
Telegram	19,775
YouTube	19,381
Facebook	17,563
Other	51,879

Table 13. Spanish-language posts per day: Maricarmen against France.

Date	Maricarmen / housing	France unrest
11 Oct	1789	210
12 Oct	1408	116
13 Oct	915	181
14 Oct	1015	218
15 Oct	782	165
16 Oct	709	268
17 Oct	593	2554
18 Oct	217	4224

Table 14. Share of all posts by each actor group that concern the unrest, per day.

Actor group	10-11	10-12	10-13	10-14	10-15	10-16	10-17	10-18
State media / state-linked	11.0	9.4	15.0	8.8	13.7	8.3	40.7	30.1
Foreign influencers	2.5	2.7	3.7	1.7	0.7	2.5	24.0	22.4
French far right	7.1	1.8	3.5	6.4	4.6	12.3	25.7	17.3
Rybar network (Telegram)			1.6	1.0	1.3	1.4	6.8	9.9

Table 15. Share of comments using the migration / Islam frame, by comment language and platform.

Language	YouTube	TikTok
French	0.7	0.3
English	4.3	2.6
German	3.3	0.8
Italian	2.6	0.0
Spanish	0.3	2.5
Portuguese	6.2	3.7

Table 16. Share of comments using the migration / Islam frame, by channel (100 or more comments).

Label	Platform	Channel	Comments	Migration / Islam frame (% of comments)
Fox News (YT)	youtube	Fox News	250	6.0
Kanał Zero (YT)	youtube	Kanał Zero	200	4.0
Bloomberg Television (YT)	youtube	Bloomberg Television	100	4.0
ZDFheute Nachrichten (YT)	youtube	ZDFheute Nachrichten	100	3.0
BBC News (YT)	youtube	BBC News	250	1.2
Reuters (YT)	youtube	Reuters	100	1.0
AFP (YT)	youtube	AFP	100	1.0
CNN Brasil (YT)	youtube	CNN Brasil	100	1.0
TF1 INFO (YT)	youtube	TF1 INFO	150	0.7
cnews (TT)	tiktok	cnews	511	0.2
Brut (YT)	youtube	Brut	100	0.0
CNEWS (YT)	youtube	CNEWS	100	0.0
BFMTV (YT)	youtube	BFMTV	150	0.0
franceinfo (YT)	youtube	franceinfo	200	0.0