

THE ENFORCEMENT GAP:

HOW SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS HANDLED POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN HUNGARY'S 2026 ELECTION

Maria Voltsichina, Alliance4Europe

Csaba Molnár, Political Capital Institute,
Hungarian Digital Media Observatory

Péter Krekó, Political Capital Institute,
Hungarian Digital Media Observatory

Adél Tilistyák, Political Capital Institute,
Hungarian Digital Media Observatory

Saman Nazari, Alliance4Europe



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Authors:

Maria Voltsichina (Alliance4Europe)

Csaba Molnár (Political Capital Institute, Hungarian Digital Media Observatory)

Péter Krekó (Political Capital Institute, Hungarian Digital Media Observatory)

Adél Tilistyák (Political Capital Institute, Hungarian Digital Media Observatory)

Saman Nazari (Alliance4Europe)

Summary

This report documents evidence of apparent systemic platform enforcement failures identified while monitoring political advertising and coordinated inauthentic behaviour on social media platforms during the Hungarian parliamentary election campaign of April 2026. Monitoring conducted by Political Capital and Lakmusz ahead of the April 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election revealed significant and recurring gaps in handling political advertising and coordinated inauthentic behaviour on Very Large Online Platforms platforms. The report deep-dives into an influence operation conducted on Facebook, and outlines monitoring and analysis of ad campaigns on Google and TikTok.

Across all three platforms, the findings point to structural gaps in enforcement design that allowed manipulation campaigns to operate with limited interruption throughout the election period. The most detailed case is of the Facebook page "Kutyakalandok," which ran 121 paid political advertisements promoting five AI-generated videos between February 20, 2026 and April 10, 2026. Meta classified all 121 advertisements as political and actioned individual removals, yet the page's operators consistently re-published identical content under new advertisement IDs (in 96% of observed cases on the same day the preceding advertisement ended, or the day after¹). This pattern, observable directly from Meta's own Ad Library data, constitutes evidence that Meta's enforcement

¹ See Fig. 3 below.

mechanisms were being systematically circumvented without triggering escalated action. At peak, 17 concurrent advertisements for a single video ran simultaneously.. Meta's system, designed to process individual advertisements, showed no apparent escalation in response to this cross-ID behavioural pattern, allowing the campaign to maintain a near-continuous presence for 50 days despite repeated removal actions.

Taken together, the four Facebook pages² examined in this report point to a single structural problem, rather than a series of moderation errors. As observable in the Ad Library, Meta's enforcement operated at the level of the individual advertisement: it was frequently triggered, often reasonably quickly, and entirely reactively. The operations Meta's systems face are organised at a different level, at which almost no enforcement response was observable. Nothing in the outcomes indicates that identical videos were linked across advertisements, relaunch chains produced no escalated response, and a page created overnight, from which the recently removed campaign continued, without being connected to its predecessor. The lack of transparency in Meta's infrastructure compounds the problem. The Ad Library made this analysis possible, but its omissions, such as the timing of political classification, the distinction between removal and expiry, the presence of AI-content labels, information about page operators, mean that researchers and other external observers working from the public Ad Library alone cannot reconstruct how the platform's enforcement actually unfolded, or verify its compliance with its own stated policies.

Nevertheless, Meta's overall removal rate was the strongest recorded among the three platforms. Response times averaged under one day, dropping to one to two hours on election day itself. However, additional anomalies were noted: three Facebook pages publishing unlabelled AI-generated videos of political figures were handled inconsistently, with two pages removed entirely rather than labelled per Meta's stated manipulated media policy, and the third page apparently seeing no enforcement action at all.

Google's performance was that much more concerning. Political Capital reported 15 advertisements to the platform – with content substantially identical to material which Meta had already removed. Google issued no written responses and removed none of the advertisements, recording a 0% removal rate. This outcome raises serious questions about Google's compliance with its obligations under the Digital Services Act (DSA).³

² "Kutyakalandok" (Dog Adventures); "Nem a mi háborúnk" (Not Our War); "Nem a mi utunk" (Not Our Way); and "Tiszta jövőt!" (For a Clean Future!).

³ Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance)

TikTok received a referral concerning a [network of 105 accounts](#)⁴ exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behaviour. It issued a determination that no violations had been detected, but the speed of case closure and the absence of any explanatory communication made it impossible for researchers to assess whether a substantive review had taken place. The lack of transparency is itself a finding: without visibility into TikTok's internal process, the "no violations" conclusion cannot be meaningfully evaluated.

The cumulative evidence from the 2026 Hungarian election monitoring period points not to isolated moderation errors, but to potentially structural deficiencies in the enforcement architectures of all three platforms reviewed. According to available data⁵, enforcement frameworks responded to individual reported items but lacked the capacity to detect and act on patterns of behaviour that emerged across multiple items, accounts, or campaigns. Such failures warrant further investigations under Articles 34 (Risk assessment) and 35 (Mitigation of risks) of the DSA. The final months of the 2026 Hungarian campaign thus offer a concentrated case study, within a single EU Member State, of what per-item enforcement yields when confronted with adaptive, AI-based advertising operations – prohibited political content in near-continuous circulation, synthetic depictions of real candidates in paid distribution, and constituency-scale audiences reached before and despite intervention. The evasion methods documented here required little more than persistence, and little suggests that the exploited vulnerabilities have been addressed. The operation across Facebook accounts *Kutyakalandok*, *Nem a mi háborúnk*, *Nem a mi utunk*, and *Tiszta Jövő!* ultimately failed to achieve what appears to have been its electoral objective, but the vulnerabilities it exploited - the reupload gap, the multi-ID redundancy strategy, the absence of cross-advertisement pattern detection - remain seemingly unaddressed and available to future actors at the time of writing.

Context and background

Data Collection

⁴ A. Biro, D. Timofte, A. Martinescu, M. Dima, (2026) "CIB Analysis – HU Elections – Automation Suffocates Information Spaces". Fact-hub. Available at <https://fact-hub.eu/cib-analysis-hu-elections-automation-suffocates-information-spaces/>

⁵ Data collected during the election monitoring period, presented in this report, sourced from the Meta Ad Library by partners at Political Capital Institute and the Hungarian Digital Media Observatory, starting 20th of February.

Two organisations [contributed](#) monitoring data to the Rapid Response System (RRS) mechanism⁶ for this election cycle: [Political Capital](#), a Budapest-based research institute specialising in disinformation, political communication and democratic integrity, and [Lakmusz](#), a Hungarian fact-checking organisation and member of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Both took part in the RRS mechanism as members of the Hungarian Digital Media Observatory (HDMO), the Hungarian hub of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). They focused primarily on Meta's advertising ecosystem, with supplementary reporting directed to Google and TikTok.

The research focused on four Facebook pages that advertised AI-generated video content targeted at the five municipalities of a single electoral constituency (Pest County No. 5), with approximately 76,000 registered voters. All findings are based on publicly available data from [Meta's Ad Library](#)⁷, collected and analysed by the authors affiliated with Political Capital. The analysis is subject to limitations that stem from the transparency of the Ad Library itself. The platform does not record Meta's classification of an advertisement as political; in some cases, classification was observed to take place only after an advertisement had already ceased running, so the platform's actual detection time cannot be reconstructed. During the monitoring period, the authors repeatedly observed advertisements that had not been labelled by Meta as political at one check of the Ad Library but carried the label at the next; in several instances, the advertisement in question was no longer running when the label appeared. Because the Ad Library displays only the current classification status and does not record when it was assigned, these earlier states cannot be retrieved retrospectively, and individual cases therefore cannot be cited. This suggests systemic short-comings in the Ad Library. However, for stopped advertisements, the status of the label is visible, but the removal itself cannot always be distinguished from the natural expiry of an ad campaign. Given this, a note will be made where platform action has been inferred, as opposed to ascertained. Terminology follows the same distinction: "removed" or "stopped" by Meta is used only where the Ad Library displays a stated policy ground, while "ended" is used where an advertisement ceased without one and natural expiry cannot be excluded. Reach figures count Facebook accounts rather than voters, and Meta's geographic targeting relies on inferred location data rather than registered residence. Finally, the Ad Library does not indicate whether users were shown labels marking content as AI-generated, so the presence or absence of such labels could not be verified. The full advertising output of all four pages was collected and processed by Political Capital Institute, with data analysis and report writing completed in cooperation by Alliance4Europe and Political Capital

⁶ [The European Commission's Rapid Response System \(RRS\)](#) exists under the Digital Services Act (DSA), and acts as a time-bound cooperation framework to address time-sensitive threats, such as foreign interference or disinformation during high-stakes elections. The European Commission activates and coordinates the framework.

⁷ Meta Ad Library, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/ads/library>

Institute. The report presents the main characteristics of the phenomenon through a small number of selected advertising examples.

No Ads Policy

On 10 October 2025, the EU regulation on political advertising – the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/900, TTPA) – [entered into full force](#). This legislation sets out detailed transparency and targeting requirements for service providers. Rather than adapting to these requirements, both Google and Meta voluntarily banned political advertising across the EU. Google [announced](#) in November 2024 that it would phase out political advertising in the EU before the TTPA took effect, [completing the process on 22 September 2025](#)⁸. Meta [made the same decision](#) on 25 July 2025 and [disabled its political advertising services on 6 October 2025](#)⁹. TikTok had already [banned political advertising](#) globally in 2019. While political advertising has thus been withdrawn from these platforms, enforcement of the ban is not consistent. As this report shows, the same advertisement can be republished by the same page several times after being taken down and remain on the platform keeping prohibited content in near-continuous circulation despite repeated removals.

Accounts Behind the Campaign

The first flagged case of this phenomenon was the Facebook page “Kutyakalandok” (Dog Adventures), which was created by unidentified individuals approximately two months before the April 2026 election. The page had no organic content; its sole function was to serve as a vehicle for paid political advertising. It promoted five AI-generated video advertisements, each targeting the same single-member constituency and each advancing an identical strategic message: endorsing the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), a party that gained less than 1% of the votes, while criticising the TISZA Party (*Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt*, Respect and Freedom party). The MKKP formally [denied](#) any connection to the page or its advertising activity. Since the operators were never identified, the campaign’s purpose can only be inferred: promoting a marginal party at the expense of the strongest opposition challenger, in a constituency decided by a simple plurality, is most

⁸ Google’s statement on the decision to withdraw from political advertising in the EU, consult section “September 2025 EU Political Ads Exit”. Available at:

<https://support.google.com/campaignmanager/answer/16542314?hl=en>

⁹ Meta statement regarding political advertisements in the EU. Available at: <https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2025/10/06/prohibiting-ads-about-social-issues-elections-or-politics-from-running-in-the-eu-due-to-regulation/>

consistent with an attempt to divert votes from the TISZA candidate and thereby improve the prospects of the governing party's candidate. On that reading, the operation did not achieve its presumed effect: in the electoral outcome, the Fidesz¹⁰-aligned candidate suffered defeat to the TISZA candidate. This does not diminish the significance of the case as evidence of a manipulative use of the platform advertising environment. Meta reviewed all 121 advertisements and classified each of them as political, confirming Meta's awareness of their electoral character, yet failed to prevent their systematic re-publication following removal actions.

Three more pages ("Nem a mi háborúnk" (Not Our War); "Nem a mi utunk" (Not Our Way); and "Tiszta Jövőt!" (For a Clean Future!)), identified in the course of the same monitoring, displayed a closely similar modus operandi. The four pages share a set of characteristics. Each was created in the months immediately preceding the election. Each was operated by actors whose identity could not be established from any available information. Each targeted its advertising at the five municipalities of the same constituency. Each promoted AI-generated video content, and most of the 662 advertisements they ran were eventually classified by Meta as political. Their political directions differed: the two war-themed pages carried no party branding but amplified a fear-centred narrative closely aligned with the governing party's campaign messaging, while *Kutyakalandok* and *Tiszta Jövőt!* presented themselves as supporters of two smaller opposition parties. We make no claim that the pages shared a common origin; what the data show is that the advertising space of a single constituency was targeted in parallel by multiple operations whose operators could not be identified, employing closely similar advertising and relaunch techniques.

Page	Created	Ads	Active period	Content	Status
Nem a mi háborúnk (Not Our War)	20 Dec 2025	379	16 Jan 2026 – 7 Mar 2026	Photorealistic AI videos depicting the horrors of war	No longer available
Nem a mi utunk (Not Our Way)	27 Feb 2026	112	27 Feb 2026 – 7 Apr 2026	Photorealistic AI war videos, several identical to the above	No longer available
Kutyakalandok (Dog Adventures)	19 Feb 2026	121	20 Feb 2026 – 10 Apr 2026	Cartoon-style AI videos promoting the MKKP candidate, criticising the TISZA candidate	Accessible, but all content deleted
Tiszta Jövőt! (For a Clean Future!)	17 Feb 2026	50	18 Feb 2026 – 9 Apr 2026	Photorealistic AI videos featuring the DK (<i>Demokratikus Koalíció</i>),	No longer available

¹⁰ Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Hungarian Civic Alliance

Page	Created	Ads	Active period	Content	Status
				Democratic Coalition) and TISZA candidates, mimicking DK's branding	

Fig. 1: The four Facebook pages and their advertising activity. Advertisement data collected during the monitoring period; page status verified on 4 August 2026. Source: Meta Ad Library.




Fig. 2: Representative frames from one advertisement on each of the four pages. All four videos are synthetic, AI-generated content. Left to right: a Hungarian soldier at a field camp, moments before being fatally shot (Nem a mi háborúnk); a figure resembling the Ukrainian president facing a conspiracy-style board displaying Péter Magyar and Viktor Orbán, with Orbán's photograph crossed out (Nem a mi utunk); the constituency candidate of the MKKP, in front of the party's lettering (Kutyakalandok); the constituency candidate of the DK before a crowd carrying party flags (Tiszta Jövőt!). The frames illustrate the format and production style of the content; the four pages are documented separately and no common origin is claimed. Frames are unedited. Source: Meta Ad Library, authors' own collection.

Initial Kutyakalandok Dataset Overview

The dataset, extracted from Meta’s Ad Library, comprises 121 individual advertisements published by the Kutyakalandok page across the period 20 February 2026 to 10 April 2026. A further advertisement promoted the page itself and is excluded from the analysis below. The advertisements are divided across five distinct video creatives (content IDs kutyakalandok_01 through

kutyakalandok_05), each with its own sub-campaign arc. All 121 advertisements were classified by Meta as political.

Video ID	No. of Ads	Campaign Start	Campaign End	Reuploads	Max Simultaneous
kutyakalandok_01	8	20 Feb 2026	13 Mar 2026	7 / 7 (100%)	4
kutyakalandok_02	30	12 Mar 2026	31 Mar 2026	28 / 29 (97%)	16
kutyakalandok_03	22	1 Apr 2026	8 Apr 2026	20 / 21 (95%)	15
kutyakalandok_04	37	30 Mar 2026	9 Apr 2026	36 / 36 (100%)	17
kutyakalandok_05	24	25 Mar 2026	10 Apr 2026	20 / 23 (87%)	15
TOTAL	121	20 Feb 2026	10 Apr 2026	111 / 116 (96%)	17 (peak)

Fig. 3: Summary of Kutyakalandok advertisement activity by video, February 2026 - April 2026. Source: Meta Ad Library.

Reuploading of advertisements

The defining modus operandi feature of the Kutyakalandok campaign is the pattern of continuous republishing of ads; when the removal of one advertisement happened (whether through Meta Terms of Service-mandated removal or regular ad date expiry), a new advertisement promoting the identical video was published within the same day or the following day. Across the entire dataset, 111 of 116 ads observed were republished (96%).

The pattern was most pronounced for kutyakalandok_01 and kutyakalandok_04, where every single ad removal resulted in an immediate re-upload (100% rate for both). Even for kutyakalandok_05, where continuity was marginally less consistent, 87% of transitions remained within the one-day re-upload window.

Because Meta does not provide data on the precise timestamps of individual ad removals and only the dates on which ads first and last appeared, it is difficult to determine in each case whether a removal was related to TOS (Terms of Service) enforcement. However, the structural pattern exists, where the account owners maintained a near-continuous advertising presence for each video, replacing each advertisement almost immediately upon its removal. The reupload pattern is most consistent with a deliberate evasion technique. By publishing multiple ad IDs for the same content simultaneously, and re-launching immediately after each removal, operators effectively neutralised Meta's enforcement actions in real time throughout the 50 days.

Simultaneous advertisements

A secondary pattern consistent with deliberate TOS circumvention is the running of multiple advertisements for the same video simultaneously. At peak, the campaign operated 17 concurrent advertisements for a single video (kutyakalandok_04). Across all five video sub-campaigns, peak simultaneous ad counts ranged from 4 to 17. This practice serves two related functions. First, it provides redundancy, whereby if one advertisement is removed, others remain active and continue to reach audiences. Second, it accelerates audience reach during enforcement gaps, maximising exposure.




Fig. 4: Continuity of advertising presence for the kutyakalandok_04 video, 30 March 2026 – 9 April 2026. Each bar spans the days on which an advertisement was actively running and being delivered to audiences; the Ad Library records first and last delivery dates only, without removal timestamps, so day-level granularity is the maximum available. The lower panel shows the number of advertisements active on each day, peaking at 17 on 8 April 2026. Source: Meta Ad Library, authors' own collection.

Advertisement content

Each of the five AI-generated videos advanced a consistent political message directed at opposition voters. The core message of each video, as summarised by the authors from the advertisements collected (with occasional phrases taken from the videos themselves), is as follows¹¹:

¹¹ Representative advertisements for each video in the Ad Library: kutyakalandok_01: [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=895548263331555]; kutyakalandok_02: [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=805909968605146]; kutyakalandok_03: [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=1707114147111731]; kutyakalandok_04:

- kutyakalandok_01: The Two-Tailed Dog Party is a true guarantee of regime change, not TISZA — TISZA only ‘barks’, but the dog actually bites.
- kutyakalandok_02: The Two-Tailed Dog Party is a true guarantee of regime change, not TISZA — TISZA doesn’t save the goal.
- kutyakalandok_03: Fidesz closes the clubs, TISZA stays silent about them: the Two-Tailed Dog Party opens them.
- kutyakalandok_04: What if the TISZA candidate is actually doing well with Fidesz’s robbery?
- kutyakalandok_05: If the Two-Tailed Dog Party is successful, the party continues, and the weed is legal.

The messaging follows a consistent strategic logic of undermining voter confidence in TISZA while directing support toward MKKP, a minor party whose success in the targeted constituency would split the opposition vote.

Observable Patterns

Prohibited political advertising ran for weeks at a time

Meta’s EU-wide ban on political advertising was enforced only partially, and, as per this research, seems to fall well short of what an election campaign in progress would warrant. The two war-themed videos examined in this report, both initially advertised by *Nem a mi háborúnk*, began with what the data strongly suggest was a testing phase: a small number of advertisements with mixed national and constituency-level targeting and minimal reach, nine advertisements running from 20 January 2026 to 2 February 2026 in one case¹², nine from 31 January 2026 to 2 February 2026 in the other¹³, none of which was stopped by Meta based on the monitoring observations from Political Capital

[<https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=26421414017489406>]; kutyakalandok_05:
 [<https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=2001621313752213>]. The advertisements are in Hungarian.

¹² Ad Library IDs of the advertisements concerned, each retrievable at [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=\[ID\]](https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=[ID]). 867798452810982, 888323277396099, 852602304311702, 866784166064133, 872074348865085, 1155222180025534, 689564250791374, 2075276489911932, 826747273703935.

¹³ Ad Library IDs of the advertisements concerned, each retrievable at [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=\[ID\]](https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=[ID]). 1136525671763735, 1933292090606774, 1437752324709672, 874115338724369, 1863153311741767, 2010166256251432, 1191132229756148, 1792225688110298, 1770156024160852.

Institute (PCI) and HDMO. Based on the same election monitoring observations from PCI and HDMO, enforcement began only after a scale-up of the operation. Across all its videos, the page launched 70 advertisements in January 2026, of which Meta removed one; in February 2026 it launched 233, of which Meta removed 175; in March 2026, 76, of which 65 were removed. *Kutyakalandok*, for its part, maintained an uninterrupted advertising presence for 50 consecutive days: between 20 February 2026 and 10 April 2026 there was not a single day on which the page had no active advertisement, despite Meta repeatedly stopping individual ads throughout that period. Enforcement efforts worked reactively and narrowly, meaning the platform would target a single advertisement, as opposed to the pages that spread it. The enforcement slowed the operation it targeted, but functioned in practice as a running cost rather than as a barrier.

Identical content was treated inconsistently

The clearest illustration comes from a 38-second photorealistic video promoted by *Nem a mi háborúnk*, which tells the story of a young couple expecting a child; the father is forcibly conscripted and killed, and the closing frame shows the mother weeping at his grave, holding their infant. On 6 February 2026, ten advertisements promoting this video were launched. Meta removed five of them within 2–4 days under its Violence and Graphic Content policy; the other five advertisements with the same content and parameters ran untouched until 23 February 2026. The inconsistency also unfolded over time: the same video had run for two weeks in January 2026 without any platform response, was then removed as violent content in February, and from late February onwards was removed repeatedly under the SIEP (Social Issues, Elections or Politics) policy instead. Identical material thus produced three different enforcement outcomes.

After the violent-content removals the operators adapted, as they released a shortened, 27-second re-edit of the video in which the opening scene (the downing of a military helicopter) was replaced with footage of the expectant mother's ultrasound examination. The change affected only the opening: violent scenes still appeared later in the video, but it no longer began with one, while the narrative and its emotional payload remained intact. The modification suggests an attempt to address the specific policy ground Meta had just invoked. Once removals shifted to the SIEP ground, which no editing could address, the operators simply reverted to the original 38-second cut and continued relaunching it in waves. Enforcement altered the operators' tactics; it did not stop the operation.

Removed advertisements were relaunched within a day

All four pages relied on relaunching, even within *Tiszta Jövőt!*'s smaller scale of operation a single 13-advertisement campaign shows four identifiable waves. But the mechanics are clearest in the fourth video promoted by *Kutyakalandok*, which insinuated that the TISZA candidate might in fact be

comfortable with "Fidesz's robbery". Its 37 advertisements were launched on eight separate days across an eleven-day span (30 March 2026 – 9 April 2026), typically in batches: two advertisements on 30 March, one on 31 March, ten on 1 April, one on 3 April, ten on 5 April, one on 7 April, ten on 8 April and two on 9 April. Individual advertisements survived for one to three days before being stopped, yet no stoppage before the final day on which this video was advertised ever left it without an active advertisement: every wave of removals was followed by new launches on the same or on the following day, and at its peak, 17 advertisements for this single video ran simultaneously. The same rhythm is visible across the page's other videos – *Kutyakalandok* as a whole kept up its unbroken 50-day advertising presence through precisely such chains – and in the wave structure of both war-themed pages. Each relaunched advertisement appears to have been treated as a new, unrelated case; Meta's response times did not improve from one wave to the next, and no escalation at the level of the page or the operation is observable in the data.

Content removed from one page was relaunched from another

The strongest evidence that enforcement outcomes are siloed at the page level comes from a video promoted successively by both war-themed pages. In the photorealistic video, a young couple's story is told through a pair of "Mr." and "Mrs." mugs; the husband, a soldier, is shot dead while drinking from his mug, and in the closing scene his widow drops her own mug as she receives the death notice.

Wave	Page	Launch (2026)	Ads	Outcome
1	Nem a mi háborúnk	31 Jan	9	Test-pattern targeting, low reach; none stopped
2	Nem a mi háborúnk	24 Feb	10	All removed by 28 Feb (SIEP)
3	Nem a mi utunk	28 Feb	1	Launched the day the removals concluded – one day after the page itself was created; ran until 24 Mar, when Meta removed it (SIEP). Reach: 76,831 users
4	Nem a mi utunk	19 Mar	5	One ad per municipality; stopped by 23–24 Mar (SIEP)
5	Nem a mi utunk	26 Mar	5	Relaunched after a one-day pause; stopped after 3 days (SIEP). No further ads followed

Fig. 5: Advertising waves of the "Mr. and Mrs. mugs" video across the two pages. Source: Meta Ad Library.

In wave 3, content that Meta had just removed, repeatedly, as prohibited political advertising was relaunched the following day from a page created for the purpose the day before then ran, untouched, for almost four weeks. During that time, the advertisement reached 76,831 users, a figure comparable to the number of registered voters in the constituency it targeted. The simultaneous stopping of the wave-3 and wave-4 advertisements on 23–24 March suggests that Meta ultimately linked the advertisements within the page; no mechanism ever linked the two pages, despite identical videos and identical targeting.

Political actors' impersonation

Two of the four pages presented themselves as supporters of opposition parties that disavowed them. *Kutyakalandok* promoted the local candidate of MKKP through cartoon-style AI videos while attacking the TISZA candidate; the MKKP formally denied any connection to the page. *Tiszta Jövő!* went further: its branding mimicked that of the DK, and its photorealistic AI-generated videos featured lifelike depictions of two real, identifiable politicians, DK's constituency candidate and the local TISZA candidate, again promoting the former and criticising the latter. DK, too, disavowed the page. The two pages shared a structure: each attached itself to a smaller opposition party, promoted that party's candidate, and attacked the strongest opposition challenger, a pattern most plausibly read as an attempt to split the opposition vote in the constituency. The pairing also demonstrates that the impersonation technique is independent of content style, operating through cartoon animation and photorealistic synthetic video alike. Whether users who saw these photorealistic synthetic depictions were shown any label identifying the content as being AI-generated cannot be established from the Ad Library.

Enforcement time lag

Reach data place the enforcement failures in proportion. In a constituency of roughly 76,000 registered voters, the three highest-reach *Kutyakalandok* advertisements reached 158,687, 133,729 and 113,164 users respectively; the top *Tiszta Jövő!* advertisement reached 115 283 users; a single *Nem a mi utunk* advertisement reached 97,904 users; and the top *Nem a mi háborúnk* advertisement reached 25,920 users¹⁴. The data is independently verifiable via the Meta Ad Library. Even allowing for the fact that reach counts accounts rather than voters and that geographic targeting is based on

¹⁴ Reach figures are taken from the "EU ad delivery " section of each advertisement's Ad Library record, which reports the number of accounts reached in the EU. Ad Library IDs of the advertisements cited, each retrievable at [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=\[ID\]](https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?id=[ID]): *Kutyakalandok*: 895548263331555, 1660956221753539, 773737685384018; *Tiszta Jövő!*: 1287574996809555; *Nem a mi utunk*: 1434996361505594; *Nem a mi háborúnk*: 1202958555321715.

inferred location, the orders of magnitude are unambiguous: individual advertisements achieved constituency-scale audiences before (or without) being stopped. Enforcement that arrives only after the operation fails to protect the electoral process and simply documents the failure to do so.

Platform enforcement and evidence of systemic failure

Meta

Meta's overall enforcement record during the monitoring period was mixed. In quantitative terms, it was the most responsive of the platforms reviewed: Political Capital recorded a 73% overall removal rate across 1,739 reported items (though for advertisements specifically the removal rate was 61%), while Lakmusz recorded a rate above 75% across 86 flagged URLs. Meta's response times were typically under one day, and the company demonstrated heightened responsiveness during the election period itself, with turnaround times of one to two hours on election day.

However, these headline figures mask a critical structural deficiency illustrated by the Kutyakalandok case. Meta's enforcement framework appears designed to process and action individual advertisements, but lacks a mechanism to detect and respond to the pattern of behaviour that emerges across multiple advertisements linked to the same content or operator. Once an individual ad was removed, the platform apparently treated each subsequent re-publication as a new and unrelated enforcement matter, requiring a fresh report and fresh review cycle. This allowed the Kutyakalandok operators to maintain a near-continuous advertising presence for 50 days despite their content having been classified as political and having been subject to repeated removal actions. This seems to be a significant failure of the enforcement system.

Additional enforcement anomalies were [observed by Lakmusz](#). Three Facebook pages were identified as publishing AI-generated videos of political figures without adequate labelling. Lakmusz's notices cited Meta's own manipulated media policy, which provides for the application of informative labels to digitally created or altered content that may mislead people. In practice, Meta did not apply labels to the content; instead, it removed two of the three pages entirely (an outcome that, while more restrictive than labelling, [diverges from the stated policy framework](#)) while taking no enforcement action whatsoever on the third page¹⁵.

¹⁵ Data is available upon request via Alliance4Europe or Political Capital Institute.

Google

Google's enforcement performance during the monitoring period was demonstrably inadequate. Political Capital submitted 15 advertisements to Google via email; no written responses were received, and no advertisements were removed. These advertisements promoted the Hungarian government's "National Petition" campaign and were, according to the submitting researchers, substantially identical to advertisements that had been reported to Meta and subsequently removed. This process proved inadequate for the purposes of electoral integrity monitoring. Google's 0% removal rate for political advertisements, combined with the absence of a written response, renders it likely to be non-compliant with its DSA obligations under Articles 16 (Notice and action mechanisms)¹⁶, 34 (Risk assessment)¹⁷, and 35 (Mitigation of risks)¹⁸.

TikTok

TikTok received a referral from Political Capital regarding a network of [105 accounts identified by Context](#), the Romanian partner of the FACT Hub, as exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behaviour. TikTok's response was that no current violations were detected regarding the activity of the accounts. The absence of transparency regarding TikTok's internal review process makes it impossible to evaluate whether the "no violations found" determination reflected a genuine investigation or a pro forma dismissal. On TikTok's reporting interface the cases appeared to close very quickly; the reports were subsequently placed under further examination, but no information was provided about what, if any, investigative steps this involved. This absence of explanatory communication could indicate a failure to comply with Article 16 of the DSA (Notice and action mechanisms).

¹⁶ Art. 16 applies to all hosting service providers (including cloud storage and social networks), and it requires them to create simple, user-friendly electronic tools so anyone can report illegal content.

¹⁷ Art. 34 applies exclusively to Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs), which are defined as services with over 45 million monthly active users in the EU. Platforms must diligently identify, analyze, and assess systemic risks flowing from their service design, algorithmic systems, or user behavior.

¹⁸ Article 35 also applies strictly to VLOPs and VLOSEs, where the platforms must put in place reasonable, proportionate, and effective mitigation measures tailored to the specific risks identified in their annual risk assessments.

Comparative Overview

Platform	Content Reported	Removal Rate	Summary
Meta (Political Capital)	1,739 items	73%	Fast response (avg. <1 day); no weekend activity; election day: 1–2 hour turnaround
Meta (Lakmusz)	86 URLs	77%	AI-video pages removed rather than labelled; no action taken in relation to one page
Google	15 ads	0%	No written responses; no removals; identical ads removed by Meta but not Google
TikTok	105 accounts	0% (reported)	No violations found; reports closed without clear investigative steps

Fig. 6: Platform enforcement outcomes across monitoring activities, Hungarian election 2026. Sources: Political Capital and Lakmusz.

DSA Implications

The lack of a systematic response across all platforms indicates a lack of consistent moderation policies or implementation of said policies. Considering the high-stakes nature of the elections, the social media platforms should have had robust policies in place regarding political advertisement and, crucially, effective enforcement of their own policies.

The results of the work of Political Capital and Lakmusz show that this does not seem to have been the case, with political advertisements slipping through the cracks and systematic measures against them not being taken, despite the repeated violations by actors. The platforms may therefore have breached Articles 34 (Risk Assessment) and 35 (Mitigation of risks) of the DSA.

Under Article 16 of the DSA, providers of hosting services, including online platforms, are obligated to follow up on reported cases, which, in this case, Google and TikTok may have failed to do.

The European Commission and national regulators need to take these findings, and those of similar research, into account in ambitious enforcement action that sets effective safeguards against societal harms, such as election interference.

Through the Counter Disinformation Network and EDMO, civil society organisations will continue to monitor this potential systemic risk, trying to identify further proof that this is not a singular case, but a systematic shortcoming based on the platforms' enforcement policies.